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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MELINDA ROLLINS, personal 
representative of the 
Estate of Marcel Schopf, 
and ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
vs. 
JON MICHAEL PETERSEN and 
STATE OF UTAH, STATE HOSPITAL, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 880280 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2(3) (j) U.C.A. as this is an appeal from an order of 
the District Court over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. What is the appropriate standard of review? 
2. Whether the Browns owe a duty to Marcel Schopf to 
properly secure the automobile. 
A. Whether U.C.A. §41-6-105 imposes a duty upon 
the Browns to secure their automobile so as to protect Marcel 
Schopf and other similarly situated from the hazards of a 
stolen automobile. 
B. Does common law impose a duty on the Browns? 
3. Whether the issue of proximate cause of the 
Brown's negligence is an issue for the trier of fact. 
4. Whether or not the acts which give rise to 
plaintiff's cause of action against State of Utah and Utah 
State Hospital is barred by the incarceration exception to the 
statutory waiver of immunity for negligence within the meaning 
of §63-30-10(10). 
5. Whether the State of Utah and Utah State Hospital 
owe a duty to protect Marcel Schopf from the acts of Jon 
Petersen. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
See Statutory Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by the personal representative 
of the heirs of Marcel Schopf against respondents, the State 
of Utah, Utah State Hospital, Dale R. and Suzette Brown, and 
Jon Petersen to recover damages for the wrongful death of 
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Marcel Schopf as a result of the fatal injuries from an 
automobile homicide committed by Jon Petersen* (R.l-2) 
Appellant maintained this action against Dale R. and 
Suzette Brown for their negligence in failing to properly 
secure their automobile. Specifically, plaintiff alleged the 
Browns negligently left the automobile unattended on a public 
street with the doors unlocked, keys in the ignition and the 
engine running. (R.l-2) 
Appellant submits that as a direct and proximate 
result of the Browns negligence, Jon Petersen was allowed to 
steal their automobile. Shortly thereafter, in an unbroken 
sequence of events resulting in a high speed chase, Petersen 
drove the Brown automobile head on into the vehicle driven by 
Marcel Schopf causing Schopfs death. (R.l-2) 
Appellant maintained this action against the State of 
Utah and Utah State Hospital for their negligence in failing 
to comply with the established policies of the Hospital and 
Jon Petersen's ward in allowing Petersen to walk away from the 
facility and in failing to discover the AWOL or to institute 
AWOL procedures as required by their own rules and 
regulations. (R.32-35, R.242) 
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Appellant submits that as a direct and proximate 
result of respondent State of Utahfs negligence, Petersen was 
allowed to go AWOL and remain free long enough to cause the 
death of Marcel Schopf. 
Prior to discovery, the Browns filed a motion for 
summary judgment based upon the theory that they owed no duty 
to Schopf and that their negligence, if any, was not the 
proximate cause of Schopffs death as a matter of law. 
(R.130-141) The Honorable Ray M. Harding granted the Browns 
motion for summary judgment. (R.176-179) The plaintiff 
petitioned for an interlocutory appeal and the petition was 
denied. 
Prior to discovery, the State of Utah and Utah State 
Hospital filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
State was immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of 
§63-30-10(1) and §63-30-10(10). (R.94-122) The state also 
argued that it owned no duty to Schopf. The parties 
stipulated that the motion be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment and discovery proceeded. (R.128) After discovery 
plaintiff filed a response and the State filed their reply to 
plaintiff's response. (R.220-254 & 261-278) After oral 
argument the trial court granted the State's motion for 
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summary judgment on the grounds that the acts complained of 
arose out of the incarceration of an individual as defined in 
§63-30-10(10) and therefore defendant Utah State Hospital was 
immune from suit, (R.298-299) The Court also ruled that the 
State owed no duty to Marcel Schopf. (R.298) The Court did 
not address the parties arguments as to the discretionary 
function exception to the waiver of immunity provisions. 
(R.298) Jon Petersen was dismissed without prejudice. (R.315) 
Plaintiff appealed Judge Harding's final orders 
dismissing the Browns and the State of Utah defendants. 
(R.317) The plaintiff asks that this Court reverse the 
District Court orders granting defendants summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. JON PETERSEN'S ACTIONS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1986 
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF MARCEL SCHOPF. 
1. At approximately 1 p.m. on November 1, 1986, Dale 
R. Brown drove his A.M.C. automobile to a friends home on 500 
East 100 North in Provo, Utah to pick up his son. Mr. Brown 
left the car parked unlocked and unattended on a public street 
next to the curb with the engine running and keys in the 
ignition. (See Affidavit of Dale R. Brown attached as Exhibit 
A.) 
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2. While Brown was inside his friend's house, Jon 
Petersen got into the A.M.C. vehicle and drove off. Mr. Brown 
saw Petersen drive off in his vehicle and got in his friend's 
vehicle to pursue. Mr. Brown followed Petersen but when 
Petersen saw Brown he sped off at a high rate of speed. By 
this time law enforcement authorities had been notified that 
an auto theft was in progress. (See Exhibit A and Utah County 
Sheriff's Incident Report attached as Exhibit B) 
3. Deputy Harris of the Utah County Sheriff's Office 
and Trooper Hunt of the Utah Highway Patrol spotted Petersen's 
vehicle as it entered 1-15 Southbound and pursued the stolen 
vehicle. (Exhibit B) 
4. Trooper Hunt turned on his red take down lights in 
an effort to pull Petersen over. Petersen saw the take down 
lights and accelerated to 85+ miles per hour. (Exhibit B) 
5. Trooper Hunt pulled even with Petersen in order to 
visually identify the driver of the stolen vehicle. Upon 
seeing the Trooper on his right side, Petersen flipped the 
bird at the Trooper and yelled "fuck you!" (Exhibit B) 
6. While expressing himself to Trooper Hunt, Petersen 
lost control of the vehicle and careened across three lanes of 
traffic before crossing the medium striking the van driven by 
Marcel Schopf. (Exhibit B) 
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7. Marcel Schopf was traveling in the center lane in 
the opposite direction when Petersen's vehicle struck his van 
on the left front drivers side. The impact caused massive 
injury and tearing to Schopf's internal organs# including a 
torn aeorta, resulting in Marcel Schopf bleeding to death from 
internal injuries. (Exhibit B) 
II. BACKGROUND AND CRIMINAL HISTORY OF JON PETERSEN. 
8. Jon Petersen has a history of psychotic behavior 
resulting in antisocial and violent behavioral traits. (See 
Exhibits 1-17, Bishop depo.) 
9. Petersen was committed to the Utah State Hospital 
in 1979 for attempted suicide wherein he jumped from a 
building but survived. (See Exhibit 1, Bishop depo.) (Addendum A-1) 
10. On or about May 24, 1982, Jon Petersen attempted 
to kill his roommate. Petersen held his roommate hostage at 
knife point for several hours. The hostage incident ended 
with Petersen stabbed his roommate four times. (See Exhibit 1 
to Bishop depo.) (Addendum A*-l) 
11. Petersen has been intermittently committed to the 
Utah State Hospital four times prior to the May 1982 attempted 
murder. The most recent being a two month commitment in 1981. 
(See Exhibit 1 to Bishop depo.) (Addendum A-1) 
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III. PSYCHOLOGICAL HISTORY OF JON PETERSEN. 
12. Following the attempted murder incident, Petersen 
was committed to the Hospital by the Court for an 
indeterminate period. According to a Hospital evaluation® 
Petersen was diagnosed as acutely psychotic resulting ir^ 
assaultive injurious behavioral history. (Psychological 
Evaluation dated September 23, 1983, Exhibit 1 to Bishop depo.) 
13. Petersenfs psychosis was evidenced inter alia by 
(a) auditory hallucinations - he hears voices, (b) homicidal 
ideatus - he roommates and writes songs about killing people 
and about knives and guns, (c) bizarre ideation - speaks of 
wanting to poke girl's eyes out. (Psychological Report, June 
2, 1983 - Exhibit 2 to Bishop depo.) (Addendum A-2) 
14. Petersen continued to exhibit assaultive behavior 
and verbal threats of violence: 
This patient continues to have what is described 
as hypo-manic run episodes that result in great 
agitation and irritability including verbal 
threats of aggressions and violence, etc. This 
is especially significant for this patient which 
has been mentioned before due to his 
assaultive-injurious behavioral history. Most 
recently it should be mentioned, that this 
patient has become thoroughly aggressive and on 
two episodes was put into the seclusion room 
because of his verbal threats of violence. 
(Psychological Report, September 19, 1983, Exhibit 5 to 
Bishop depo.) (Addendum A-3) 
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15. During an interview in 1983 Petersen admitted to 
his propensity toward verbal intimidation and potentially 
violent behavior: 
Patient also behaved in a very macho masculine 
manner and stated he felt dangerous, that he was 
a tough macho guy and that people had to be 
afraid of him. 
Patient does require trained staff supervision 
or he becomes a behavioral management problem 
and in [sic] (is) potentially dangerous. This 
is manifested not only by his aggressive 
episodes from time to time but his continual 
liumination and thinking of aggressive and 
violent acts and stating these to both staff and 
patients. (Emphasis added) 
(Psychological Reporter, September 19, 1983, Exhibit 5 
to Bishop depo.) (Addendum A-3) 
16. Petersen has poor impulse control. (Forsyth depo. 
p.6; Wilkinson depo. p.35) (Addendum A-4) 
17. Petersen exhibits poor anger management. (Forsyth 
depo. p.6-7) (Addendum A-4) 
IV. KNOWN MOTIVES, PERSONALITY TRAITS AND PERSONAL 
FACTORS LEADING TO THE AUTOMOBILE THEFT AND ACCIDENT RESULTING 
IN THE DEATH OF MARCEL SCHOPF. 
A. Petersen's History of Assaultive Behavior. 
18. In 1982 Petersen held his roommate hostage at 
knife point and stabbed him four times. (Fact 10) 
19. Petersen would get physically abusive when he was 
ordered to do something and refused. Help would be called in 
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and Petersen would fight and struggle when being placed in a 
more restrictive environment. (Bishop depo. p.22, lines 7-25 )(Add.A-! 
20. In the summer of 1984, psych tech Andrew Forsyth 
was forced to take Petersen's cigarettes away because his 
smoking privileges had been revoked. When Petersen didn't get 
his cigarettes, he struck an attendant. While assisting in 
the restraining of Petersen, Petersen kicked Forsyth in the 
face fracturing his jaw. (Forsyth depo. p.5-6) (Addendum A-4) 
21. Petersen is frequently physically restrained. 
(Forsyth depo. p.6; Bishop depo. p.22) (Addendum A-4, A-5) 
22. In September of 1986, less than three months 
prior to the AWOL incident, Petersen became involved in a 
violent confrontation with other inmates resulting in injuries 
to himself. (Wilkinson depo. p.30-31) (Addendum A-6) 
B. Petersen's propensity toward verbal abuse, a short 
temper, and impulsive behavior. 
23. Petersen is quick to anger and is described as 
having a short fuse. (Forsyth depo. p.5; Wilkinson depo. p.40)(Add.A-
24. Petersen becomes loud and verbally abusive almost^ 
on a daily basis. Verbal abuse includes insults, threats and -
foul language. (Messersmith depo. p.5; Forsyth depo. p.5) (Add.A-8,A-
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25. Petersen's verbal intimidation and abuse would 
occasionally result in physical confrontations with other 
patients. (Messersmith depo. p*5; Forsyth depo. p.5-6) (Adden. A-8fA-4) 
26. Petersen exhibited poor impulse control wanting 
certain things immediately. (Bishop depo. p. 36)(Addendum A-9) 
27. Petersen is very unpredictable. (Messersmith 
depo. p.5) (Addendum A-8) 
28. In one incident, Petersen barricaded himself in a 
room and started the carpet on fire when he did not get his 
way. (Bishop depo. p. 39 )(Addendum A-10) 
C. Petersen as an AWOL risk. 
29. In September of 1983, one year after Petersenfs 
most recent commitment/ Petersen went AWOL (Absent Without 
Official Leave) from the Hospital. After two hours, Petersen 
phoned the Hospital asking to be picked up. (Bishop depo. 
Exhibit 7)(Addendum A-ll) 
30. In 1985, Petersen against went AWOl from the ARTV 
Treatment Program in Salt Lake City. He ran away to his 
sister's home and was subsequently returned to the Hospital. 
(Wilkinson depo. p.51-52 ) (Addendum A-12) 
31. Petersen was listed as an AWOL risk in every 
psychological evaluation prepared by his evaluation team. (See 
Exhibits 1-20 to Bishop depo.) Although it was listed as "in 
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remission" from August 1985 on, Petersen still was a potential 
AWOL risk after that date. (Bishop depo. p.40) (Addendum A-13) 
V. MISSION OF THE HOSPITAL. 
32. In addition to treating mentally ill patients, it» 
is also a mission of the Hospital to protect the community by 
separating the dangerously mentally ill from the community. 
(Paul Thorpe, Administrator, p.8-9) (Addendum A-14) 
VI. EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1986, UP TO THE POINT 
PETERSEN STOLE THE CAR. 
33. On the morning of November 1, 1986, Jon Petersen 
refused to get out of bed and take his medications. His 
privileges were revoked. (Messersmith depo. p.7-8)(Addendum A-15) 
34. Any time a patient leaves the ward, the patient 
must sign out and have the slip approved. The sign out 
records the patient's destination, clothing, and expected time 
of return. (Wilkinson depo. p.23; Messersmith depo. p.18-19; 
Taylor depo. p.19) (Addendum A-16) 
35. The ward policies and procedures mandates that a 
patient sign out whenever they leave the ward. (Wilkinson 
depo. p.20, 23, lines 10-18): (Addendum A-17) 
We have a system on the unit that requires at 
any time someone is using there pass or going to 
their industrial or whatever, they must sign 
out. And there is a form for them to do that. 
On the form is included what they are wearing, 
what their destination is, who they are going 
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with, a description of their clothing. If an 
individual is not signed back in within five 
minutes of that time then we consider them a 
potential AWOL. 
(Emphasis added) 
36. Prom the time Petersen left to take the dishes 
back at anytime between 12:15 and 12:30 until he stole the 
car, sometime after 1 p.m., an estimated 30 to 50 minutes 
transpired. (Exhibit A) 
37. Had the Ward followed written, established 
procedures, Petersen's AWOL could have been discovered at 
least 20 minutes to 40 minutes prior to the time he stole the 
car. It would have taken a patrol car 3 to 5 minutes to drive 
the distance between the Hospital and Maeser School had 
procedures been followed. There is a good likelihood hat had 
AWOL procedures been followed, Petersen would have been 
apprehended prior to stealing the car. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point i: Point I is the standard of review regarding 
summary judgment. 
Point II: The Browns owed plaintiff and all other 
motorists a duty to properly secure their vehicle. This duty 
is imposed by U.C.A. §41-6-105, Utah's Unattended Motor 
Vehicle law, and common law duty to vehicle owners to take 
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reasonable precautions to prevent the unauthorized dangerous 
operation of the owners vehicle, 
Schopf was a member of the class the "Unattended Motor 
Vehicle" statute was enacted to protect and that statute 
therefore imposed upon the Browns a duty to secure their 
vehicle. This duty runs to the benefit of all motorist, 
including plaintiff, Malan v. Lewis/ 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 
1984). The trial court committed reversible error in holding 
that the Browns owed plaintiff no duty. 
Point ill: Whether the negligence of the Browns is a 
proximate cause of Schopf's death is an issue for the trier of 
fact. Statistical evidence demonstrates that a stolen car is 
200 times more likely to be involved in an accident than is 
the regular car. Moreover, whether it is foreseeable that a 
car would be stolen if left unattended with the engine running 
and the keys in the ignition is a question of fact. 
Point IV; The incarceration exception to the waiver 
of immunity for negligence does not bar this cause of action 
against the State of Utah because the exception was enacted 
only to bar lawsuits by prisoners. The legislature did not 
intend on barring third party lawsuits and to the extent dicta 
in Epting v. State is contrary, it should be limited. Doe v. 
Arguelles implicitly 
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limits the scope of the incarceration exception, Moreover, 
the incarceration exception does not apply because Petersen 
was not incarcerated at the time the negligence occurred. 
Point V: The State owed Schopf a clearly defined duty 
to restrain Petersen because it assumed control of a dangerous 
individual by means of a court ordered involuntary 
commitment. Section 319 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) 
imposes this duty as does this Court's decisions in Little v, 
Division of Family Services and Doe v. Arguelles. Moreover/ 
it is foreseeable that Petersen would act in the manner he did 
due to his history of verbal abuse, physical violence, 
impulsive behavior and antisocial psychotic personality. The 
issue of foreseeability is an issue for the trier of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's ruling granting 
defendants' motions for summary judgment, in reviewing a case 
disposed of in the District Court by summary judgment this 
Court considers the evidence and facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party and affirms only where it 
appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues 
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of fact, Themy v. Seagull Enterprises. Inc., 595 P.2d 526 
(Utah 1979); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS DALE R. AND SUZETTE BROWN OWED PLAINTIFF A 
DUTY OF CARE TO PROPERLY SECURE THEIR AUTOMOBILE. 
A finding of negligence requires the presence of duty 
between the parties. Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1979). The existence of a duty is an issue of law for the 
Court to decide. Little v. Utah State Division of Family 
Services/ 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). Duty may be imposed by the 
Court under an analysis which takes into consideration public 
policy considerations. Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1979) A duty may also be imposed by statute. Langlois v. 
Rees, 10 Utah2d 272, 357 P.2d 638 (1960). 
In this case, U.C.A. §41-6-105 imposed a duty on the 
Browns to turn off the engine and remove the keys from the 
ignition when they leave their car unattended. U.C.A. 
§41-6-105 provides: 
No person driving or in charge of a motor 
vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended 
without first stopping the engine, locking the 
ignition and removing the key, . . . 
In this case, by his own admission, Mr. Brown stated 
that he violated the statute. (See Brown Affidavit, Appendix A) 
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(R.140-141) The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument 
that the statute was enacted to prevent auto theft and ruled 
that the statute does not apply to the facts of this case* 
(R.176-177) This ruling ignores the express purpose of the 
"lock and remove key" statute is to prevent injury due to auto 
theft. 
Although there are no Utah cases discussing the 
purpose of this statute, other courts have construed similar 
statutes and imposed a duty on owners of stolen vehicles who 
have violated the statutes. In Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich 
138, 180 N.W.2d 11, 15 A.L.R.3d 778 (1970), the Michigan 
Supreme Court faced a question remarkably similar to the 
issues before this Court, including the interpretation of a 
similar unattended vehicle law. Davis involved an action for 
negligence resulting in injuries caused by a thief who stole a 
car which was left unattended with the keys in the ignition. 
As the court stated the facts: 
On the evening of April 4, 1965, defendant 
Williams was driving the car of his employer, 
defendant Thornton, while on his employers 
business. He parked his car near the 
intersection of Miami and Beatrice Streets on 
Detroit's lower west side, left the keys in the 
ignition, failed to lock the doors and may have 
left the motor running. While so left, a group 
of minors took the car for a "joyride" and, 
while joyriding, they crossed the centerline of 
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a highway and collided with plaintiff's car, 
killing one and injuring five of the other 
occupants of plaintiff's car, 
Davis, 45 A.L.R.3d at 780. 
The trial court awarded the defendant's motion 
dismiss and plaintiff appealed. 
The Davis court examined the effect of a Detr 
ordinance that went as follows: 
No operator, except those of commercial 
vehicles, shall leave the vehicle unattended at 
the curb or other place to which the public has 
access unless the operator shall first shut off 
the motor and lock the motor vehicle or some 
part thereof as to prevent the starting and 
operation of the motor vehicle. 
City of Detroit Code §38-8-5 
The Davis court stated the purpose of this ordinance: 
Such an ordinance exists by virtue of the police 
power of the city government to promote the 
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The 
ordinance contemplates that a key left in the 
ignition is dangerous, not because it is then 
harmful, but because it creates a condition 
likely to cause harm. The instrument of actual 
cause of harm would necessarily be a person who 
would start the engine. Such a person could be 
an inexperienced child, a joyriding youth or a 
thief. The harm that could be caused 
presupposes a meddler who will necessarily harm 
the owner of the vehicle but far more 
importantly, the theft threatens society. 
(Emphasis added) 
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The court then cited statistics showing that of total 
cars stolen, the key had been left either in the ignition or 
in the car in 42.3 percent of the cases. Moreover, "the 
accident rate for stolen cars is 200 times the normal accident 
rate." Davis, 45 A.L.R.3d at 782. The court thus held that 
the ordinance imposed a duty of due care on the defendant and 
it was a jury to decide whether that breach of duty cause 
plaintiff's injuries. Davis, 45 A.L.R.3d at 785. 
In Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 354 So.2d 
54 (Fla 1978), the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the 
exact issue that is before this Court. As the Court stated: 
This case presents the issue of whether the 
owner of a car, who leaves it unlocked with the 
key in the ignition in violation of Florida's 
Unattended Motor Vehicle Statute, Section 316097 
(Fla Statutes 1975) is liable for the conduct of 
a thief who steals the car and subsequently 
injures someone while negligently operating the 
stolen vehicle. 
In holding that the Florida statute imposed a duty 
upon the owner to third parties, the Court stated: 
The legislature recognized that an automobile 
placed in the hands of an unauthorized person 
was more likely to be operated in a manner 
hazardous to the well being of the general 
public. Statistical data provided strong 
support for this position. See Gaither v. 
Myers, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 404 F.2d 216, 
222-23 (1968). 
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Turning to plaintiff's complaint he is clearly a 
member of the class Florida's Unattended Motor 
Vehicle" Statutes was intended to protect. 
Also, the injuries he sustained were the type 
the statute was designed to prevent. if 
plaintiff can establish that the violation of 
the statute was the proximate cause of his 
injury, he is entitled to recover. 
Id. at 56. (Emphasis added) Accord Baginski v. New York 
Telephone Company, 515 N.Y.S.2d 23 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1987) 
Other courts have imposed a duty even in the absence 
of a statutory obligation. Mezyk v. National Repossessions, 
Inc., 405 P.2d 840 (Or. 1965); State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 
186 (Minn 1976); and Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super 432, 294 
A.2d 727 (1972). 
In Zinck v. Whelan, 294 A.2d 727 (NJ 1972), the Court 
imposed a duty by extensively analyzing the statistical 
evidence which showed the enormous increase in injuries 
occurring as a result of the negligent operation of stolen 
automobiles. I_d. at 294 A.2d 735-36. As the Court stated: 
The fact that 23 state legislatures and 
countless municipal governing bodies have for a 
long time deemed it necessary as a matter of 
public safety to prohibit leaving ignition keys 
in unattended unlocked cars attests to the 
widespread general recognition of the hazard in 
question and its potential for great harm to 
innocent users of the highways. . . . A cause 
reasonably to be anticipated or guarded against 
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may be found to include the theft of a car in a 
situation as here and the negligent injury of 
others on the highway by the thief. 
Id, at 736. 
In this case defendants Brown argue that they owed no 
duty to Schopf to take reasonable steps to prevent a thief 
from stealing their automobile and that §41-6-105 U.C.A. was 
not enacted to protect motorists from negligent injuries 
caused by thieves driving stolen cars. 
This argument ignores the fact that Utah's unattended 
vehicle law contains the exact or similar language as the 
Florida, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, and New Jersey 
statutes which one court stated "clearly" was intended to 
protect motorists from the inherent recklessness of automobile 
thieves. Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 354 A.2d at 
56. 
Moreover, public policy considerations support the 
above conclusion as the Davis and Zinck courts noted of all 
cars stolen, the key had been left in the ignition or in the 
car 42 percent of the time. Zinck, 294 A.2d at 735. 
Moreover, and of utmost importance, "the accident rate for 
stolen cars is 200 times the normal accident rate." Davis, 45 
A.L.R.3d at 782. The above statistics strongly support the 
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imposition of a duty. Indeed this court has already stated "a 
driver owes a duty of due care to all other persons on the 
highway.11 Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 1984). 
This Court should extend the above statements to include a 
duty to properly secures ones automobile as required by U.C.A.^ 
§41-6-105 so as to take reasonable steps to prevent automobile 
theft and its subsequent hazard to the general public. 
POINT III 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE BROWNS 
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MARCEL SCHOPF IS A 
QUESTION OF FACT TO BE DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT. 
Proximate cause is generally a matter of fact to be 
determined by the jury. Provo v. Godesky, 690 P.2d 541, 544 
(Utah 1984); Walters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 457-458 (Utah 
1981). 
Courts reviewing the issue of whether a car owners 
negligence in leaving the keys in the ignition and the car is 
stolen causing injuries to third parties is a proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries have held that proximate cause is an 
issue for the jury. Rulye v. Reynols, 357 N.E.2d 804, 808 
(Ill.App. 1976); Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 354 ' 
So.2d 54, 56 (Fla 1976); Mezyk v. National Repossessions, ^ 
Inc., 405 P.2d 840, 842 (Or. 1965). 
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Defendants appear to be arguing that the actions of 
Jon Petersen in stealing the car constitute a superseding 
cause of plaintifffs injury as a matter of law. This Supreme 
Court has recently reviewed at length the status of an 
intervening cause on the chain of causation and when an 
intervening cause rises to the level of a superseding cause as 
a matter of law. 
In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985), 
the Court discussed what constitutes a superseding cause. 
Specifically the Court stated: 
The issue of what constitutes a superseding 
cause can not be determined by a simplistic 
formula that the cause which occurs last in time 
is, as a matter of law, a superseding cause. 
Indeed, conduct may be negligent simply because 
subsequent negligent conduct by another is 
foreseeable. 
Id. at 728. 
As the Court stated in a recent case: 
A persons negligence is not superseded by the 
negligence of another if the subsequent 
negligence of another is foreseeable. 
Harris v% Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983) 
Moreover, this Supreme Court has held that the 
criminal conduct of a third party may be foreseeable. 
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Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah 
1985)* Mitchell involved an action against a hotel for 
failure to reasonably provide for the safety of hotel patrons 
and a patron was killed as a result of that negligence* The 
trial court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment 
inter alia, based upon the fact that the murder was not 
reasonably foreseeable and the death was caused by the 
intervening independent criminal act of a third person. Id. 
at 243. 
Although this Court affirmed summary judgment for lack 
of evidence, this Court stated: 
In the context of the hotel/guest relationship, 
it is foreseeable that an inkeepers failure to 
maintain adequate security measures not only 
permits but may even encourage intruders to rob, 
assault or murder hotel patrons. 
In the case at hand it is a question for the jury to 
decide whether the actions of Jon Petersen were foreseeable. 
Moreover, it is also a question of fact as to whether Dale 
Brown's failure to secure his car led to a sequence of events 
resulting in Marcel Schopf's death. The facts indicate that 
Jon Petersen was involved in an unbroken pursuit from the time 
he stole the car until he collided with Marcel Schopf. (See 
Exhibit B) The question of proximate cause in this case is a 
question for the trier of fact. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING BY HOLDING THE 
INCARCERATION EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTORY WAIVER OF IMMUNITY 
FOR NEGLIGENCE BARS THIS ACTION AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH AND 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
The trial court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis this action is barred by §63-30-10(10) 
because the injury "arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail or other place 
of legal confinement." The court relied on this Court's 
decision in Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971) and 
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). For the following 
reasons Epting is inapplicable to this action. 
A. Epting v. State is not controlling. 
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), involved a 
case where a state prisoner was allowed to leave the prison on 
a daily basis on a work release program. While on work 
release, the inmate, Michael Hart, murdered Cynthia Epting 
Mitchell. The children of Epting filed an action against the 
State alleging that the state negligently placed Hart in a 
work release program. This Court ruled against plaintiff's 
under a discretionary function analysis holding: "that the 
handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was something which 
arises out of the exercise of a discretionary function for 
-25-
which subsection (1) of §63-30-10 quoted above has retained 
sovereign immunity." jrd. at 24 (Emphasis added) 
The State however relied on Epting for its argument 
that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the 
incarceration exception to waiver. The Court however stated: 
The foregoing (discretionary function analysis) 
adequately supports the ruling of the trial 
court. But the ruling was also based upon 
subjection (10) of Section 63-30-10 quoted 
above, which leaves the protection of sovereign 
immunity for injuries which arise out of 
incarceration in state prison. We therefore 
make this additional comment: 
As to the status of Michael Hart vis-a-vis the 
State Prison, there seems to be two alternatives 
either (a) He had totally escaped the control of 
the prison and was thus acting on his own so 
that the prison was not responsible for him; or 
(b) He was still under the control of the prison 
authorities so that his conduct would "arise out 
of the incarceration of any person in [the] 
State Prison . . . " in which latter instance the 
prison is immune from suit under the statute. 
Id. at 24 (Emphasis added) 
The Court quite clearly was adding dicta to its 
decision under a discretionary function analysis by the above 
underlined statement. Moreover, this Court has implicitly 
modified subsection (a) of the above Epting dicta in Doe v. 
Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), where this Court held 
that the state may be responsible for the actions of inmates 
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after they have left the actual physical incarceration of the 
state. Doe, 716 P.2d at 283. 
A careful reading of a long line of cases interpreting 
the incarceration exception indicates that the purpose of the 
exception is to prevent lawsuits filed by prisoners and other 
incarcerated individuals or their heirs. With the exception 
of the Epting dicta, no case has applied the incarceration 
exception to lawsuits filed by third parties. See Lancaster 
v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987) (lawsuit by 
prisoner for personal injuries); Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1978) (wrongful death - action by heirs of prisoner who 
died after alleged negligent surgery at prison hospital); 
Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979) (action by 
prisoner for conversion of personal property). 
In Madsen and Schmitt this Court held that actual 
incarceration and control were a prerequisite to application 
of the incarceration exception. Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93; 
Schmitt, 600 P.2d at 518. This Court has not yet ruled on 
whether §63-30-10(10) bars a claim arising outside the prison 
or state hospital as does this action. As previously argued, 
Epting did not so hold and does not bind this Court through 
stare decisis to its dicta. 
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In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), the Court 
was presented with legislative debate that indicated that 
subsection (10) was intended to prevent lawsuits by prisoners 
which would disrupt orderly prison administration. Se%? 
recording of Senate Proceedings, January 20, 1965, Part III^ 
Side 1, Lieutenant Governor's office. This section therefore 
was not enacted to prevent innocent third parties from suing 
the state for negligence and subsection (10) does not apply to 
bar this lawsuit. 
POINT V 
THE STATE OWED A CLEARLY DEFINED DUTY TO PROTECT 
MARCEL SCHOPF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED FROM THE ACTS OF 
JON PETERSEN. 
The State, by affirmatively undertaking the 
responsibility to involuntarily commit the dangerous mentally 
ill, has undertaken a duty to protect both the public at large 
and individual citizens who might foreseeably be harmed by the 
actions of said patients. Petersen's acts leading to Marcel 
Schopf's death were not only foreseeable but should have 
reasonably been expected. The Hospital's employees' failure 
to act within the authority of their defined area of 
responsibility and failure to promptly discover Petersen's^ 
absence substantially contributed to the chain of events 
resulting in Schopf's death. 
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A. This Court should adopt Section 319, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts on the issue of duty. 
There is no controlling Utah case law on the issue of 
duty in a mental patient setting. The better-reasoned cases 
following the Restatement (Second) of Torts §319, which states: 
Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having 
Dangerous Propensities. One who takes charge of 
a third person whom he knows or should know to 
be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not 
controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person to 
prevent him from doing harm. 
This Court recognized the Restatement of Torts as controlling 
authority in defining duty in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), and should continue to follow the 
Restatement analysis here. 
The basis for applying different standards under the 
"public duty11 rule generally and the mental patient release 
situation specifically is discussed in Nelson, Victims1 Suits 
Against Government Entities and Officials for Reckless 
Release, 29 Am.U.L.Rev. 595, 614-15 (1980): 
By voluntarily assuming control over inmates, 
the government also assumes the obligation to 
control their behavior . . . 
The (public duty) rule, however, should not 
apply to the release of inmates from government 
detention facilities. The rule is generally 
used to deny claims against the government for 
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failure to provide public services designed to 
benefit the community at large, such as police 
protection. The duty to control the conduct of 
another based on the relationship between the 
parties does not arise in cases involving the 
failure to provide services. When a victim is 
attacked by an assailant, against whom police 
protection had been refused, there is no duty 
owed to the victim because there is no 
relationship between the police and the 
assailant. Furthermore, there is clearly no 
voluntary assumption of a duty by the police 
when they fail to provide protection to a 
citizen. In release situations, however, the 
government has voluntarily assumed the control 
of an inmate by placing him in a detentional 
facility. A duty to the victim arises out of 
this voluntary assumption of custodial 
responsibility by the government. 
Citations omitted; emphasis added. 
In Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington D.C., 
538 F.2d 121 (11th Cir. 1976), plaintiff, mother of a young 
girl killed by a Virginia probationer who had been under a 
court order to undergo treatment at the psychiatric institute, 
filed an action against the institute for failing to confine 
the defendant as ordered by the court. The court did not 
approve the probationer's outpatient status. The institute 
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the order created no 
duty on their part to plaintiff. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court stated: 
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It is apparent that the decision to release 
Gilreath was not simply a medical judgment based 
upon the state of his mental health. The 
decision would also entail a judgment by the 
court as to whether his release would be in the 
best interest of the community. The special 
relationship created by the probation order, 
therefore, imposed a duty upon the appellants to 
protect the public from the reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm at Gilreath's hands 
that the state judge had already recognized. 
Id. at 121 (Emphasis added) 
The Court then adopted Section 319 of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts quoted supra and further stated: 
The Restatement measures a custodian's duty by 
the standard of reasonable care. . . . The 
appellants were to retain custody of Gilreath 
until he was released from the institute by 
order of the court. No lesser measure of care 
will suffice. This obligation is not absolute 
of course. The appellants would not be liable 
had Gilreath escaped despite their exercise of 
reasonable care. . . 
^d. 538 F.2d at 121 
Other cases adopting Section 319 of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as it applies to a duty owed third parties 
in a custodial mental patient relationship are Beck v. Kansas 
University of Psychiatric Foundation, 580 F.Supp. 527, 534 
(D.Kan. 1984); Brady v. Hopkins, 570 F.Supp. 1333,1337 
(D.Colo. 1983), Affirmed 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(acknowledging duty to third parties but found evidence 
-31-
insufficient as to foreseeability of harm); Bradley Center, 
Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1982); 
Knight v. State, 99 Mich.App. 226, 297 N.W.2d 889, 894 (1980); 
Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984); Allentown 
State Hospital v. Gill, 88 Pa. Commonwealth 331, 488 A.2d 1211 
(1985). 
Other State Supreme Court decisions discussing or 
adopting the special duty for correctional release situations 
of Restatement of Torts (Second) §319 include: Division of 
Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986); Cansler v. 
State of Kansas, 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 (1984); White v. 
State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Grimm v. Arizona Board of 
Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 
1977); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); and 
Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969). 
In Doe v. Arguelles, supra, this Court cited Semler as 
authority for the proposition that acts implementing policy 
must be considered on a case by case basis to determine 
whether they are discretionary or ministerial. Doe at 716 
P.2d at 283. The Court could not have reached the 
discretionary analysis unless duty was present. 
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Thus, §319 of Restatement of Torts (Second) has 
received widespread adoption as to the duty owed innocent 
third parties in a custodial release or escape situation. In 
order to clarify the status of the law in Utah, this Court 
should expressly adopt the restatement as it applies to duty, 
B. The State owed a duty to Schopf because it assumed 
a special relationship to protect Schopf by depriving him and 
others of reasonable means of self protection. 
The State claims that it owed Schopf no duty. This is 
not in accord with recent Court decisions. This Court's 
latest discussion upon the issue of duty is found in Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) wherein this 
Court held: 
The law imposes upon one party an affirmative 
duty to act only when certain special 
relationships exist between the parties. These 
relationships generally arise when one assumes 
responsibility for another's safety or deprives 
another of his or her normal opportunities for 
self-protection. The essence of a special 
relationship is dependence by one party upon the 
other or mutual dependence between the parties. 
Id. at 32; citations omitted; emphasis added. 
There is no question the State has assumed a special 
relationship of protecting the community and the individuals 
who make up that community. The State has imposed upon itself 
-33-
a duty to protect the general public. The State assumed the 
duty of protecting the public from mentally ill patients who 
are a danger to themselves or others. Specifically, §64-7-8 
states: 
The objectives of the Utah State Hospital and 
other mental health facilities shall be to care 
for all persons within the State who are subject 
to the provisions of this act, and to furnish 
them proper attendance, medical treatment, 
seclusion, rest, restraint, amusement, 
occupation and support conducive to their 
physical and mental well being. (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, it is clear from three other sections of 
Title 64 that the State assumed a duty to protect the public. 
U.C.A. §64-7-24.5 provides for criminal penalties for any 
person involuntarily committed to leave the hospital without 
legal permissions. U.C.A. §64-7-34 and 36(10(b) provides for 
involuntary commitment of patients if they are a danger to 
self or others. Petersen was involuntarily committed after 
holding his roommate hostage at knife point. (Fact 10) 
Utah State Hospital administrator Paul Thorpe freely 
acknowledged that it is the Hospital's additional 
responsibility to protect the public from the dangerously 
mentally ill: 
Q (By Mr. Souvall) It is also a mission of 
the hospital that you are here to protect 
the surrounding community from those who 
could be dangerous, disruptive, difficult 
to manage mentally ill? 
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A Thatfs a role of the hospital that we are 
here to provide a setting for the patient 
that is dangerous to self and others, 
Q In addition to then helping the 
patient to enter the community 
again, then there is also a role for 
the hospital that involves 
separating that individual from the 
community, is that correct? 
A Yes* There is a responsibility. 
Thorpe depo. p.8-9 
The State accepted the responsibility of keeping the 
public safe from Petersen and, by failing to follow its own 
policies and procedure, deprived the public of their "normal 
opportunities for self-protection", Beach at 32, thereby 
establishing "the essence of a special relationship" which is 
"dependence by one party upon the other." I_d. Once such a 
special relationship is established, 'the law imposes upon one 
party"; i.e., the State, "an affirmative duty to act." As the 
Court stated in Semler, supra, "the special relationship 
created by the probation order therefore imposed a duty on 
appellants to protect the public from the reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm at Gilreath's hands that the state 
judge had already recognized." J^ d. 538 F.2d at 121. (Emphasis 
added) 
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c #
 Foreseeability of Petersen's acts is an issue for 
the trier of fact. 
In the context of Petersen's case the State argues 
that it has no duty because the acts of Petersen were noti: 
reasonably foreseeable. Specially the State argues the 
foreseeability of a particular type of injury to a specific 
plaintiff is necessary before a duty is said to exit, in Rees 
v. Albertson's Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978), the Court 
discussed foreseeability in the context of a proximate cause, 
not duty, and stated the following standard for foreseeability 
analysis: 
What is necessary to meet the test of negligence 
and proximate cause is that it be reasonably 
foreseeable, not that the particular accident 
would occur, but only that there is a likelihood 
of an occurrence of the same general nature. In 
that connection, it is to be had in mind that 
the jury is entitled to base its judgment, not 
only upon the facts shown, but to indulge such 
reasonable inferences as may be fairly drawn 
therefrom. Considered in that light, we think 
reasonable minds could believe that in selling 
beer to a minor, such as plaintiff, the 
defendant reasonably should have foreseen the 
likelihood of it being combined with an 
automobile and result in some occurrence such as 
eventuated here. 
To be considered in connection with what has 
been said above are these principles;: that the 
questions relating to negligence and proximate 
cause are generally for the fact-trier, court or 
jury, to determine. A party should not be 
deprived of the privilege of having such an 
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adjudication of his claims unless it appears 
that even upon the facts claimed by him he could 
not establish a basis for recovery. Moreover, 
when there is doubt about the matter, it should 
be resolved in favor of permitting the party to 
go to trial. 
Id. at 133 (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the particular injury need not be foreseeable, 
i.e., Petersen stealing a car and running in to decedent, 
killing him. As the facts indicate, Petersen's actions are 
quite foreseeable. Petersen was initially committed for 
holding his roommate hostage at knife point. (Fact 10) After 
involuntary commitment to the hospital, Petersen was diagnosed 
as being acutely psychotic resulting in assaultive injurious 
behavioral history. (Fact 12) Petersen's psychosis was 
evidenced by homicidal ruminations. (Fact 13) Petersen had a 
history of violent behavior. (Facts 10, 14, 15, 18-22) 
Moreover, he exhibited poor impulse control and was quite 
impulsive. (Facts 23-27) and he as an AWOL risk. (Facts 
29-31) It is reasonably foreseeable that these personality 
traits could result in mischief if Petersen was turned loose 
unsupervised in the general populace. Petersen's actions were 
predictable in light of his aforementioned personality traits. 
Moreover, foreseeability is a question of proximate 
cause under Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d at 133, which 
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is a question for the trier of fact and summary judgment on 
the issue of foreseeability is improper. 
Thus the State assumed a clearly defined duty to 
Schopf by depriving him of the ability to protect himself from 
Petersen. The injury that resulted was foreseeable when 
Petersen's past AWOL, psychological and personality histories 
are reviewed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons plaintiff/appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the final order of the 
District Court granting Dale R. and Suzette Brown and the 
State of Utah summary judgment and remand this matter for 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this f(g ^ day of November, 
1988. 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY HySOUVAEL 
Attonvey for Appellant 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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41-6-105 MOTOR VEHICLES 
state highway unless the Department of Transportation has determined that 
the roadway is of sufficient width to permit angle parking without interfering 
with the free movement of traffic. 
(4) The Department of Transportation with respect to highways under its 
jurisdiction may place traffic-control devices prohibiting or restricting the 
stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles on any highway where in its opinion 
such stopping, standing, or parking is dangerous to those using the highway 
or where the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere 
with the free movement of traffic. No person shall stop, stand, or park any 
vehicle in violation of the restriction indicated by such devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 91; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Disabled persons, 
57-7-168; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, parking privileges, § 41-1-49.9. 
§ 44; 1978, ch. 33, § 35. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo- C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 336. 
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 274, 275. Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 173(2). 
ARTICLE 15 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
41-6-105. Motor vehicle left unattended — Requirements. 
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand 
unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and remov-
ing the key, placing the transmission in "park" or the gears in "low" or "re-
verse" if the vehicle has a manual shift, or effectively setting the brakes 
thereon; and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, turning the front 
wheels to the curb or side of the highway. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 92; C. 1943, 
57-7-169; L. 1969, ch. 112, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Contributory negligence. 
Jury question. 
Contributory negligence. 
In action for injuries suffered by driver of 
city garbage truck, when parking brake on the 
garbage truck, of which he was in charge, sud-
denly gave way so that he was unable to get 
back into and control the garbage truck, issues 
of whether the driver had left the truck unat-
tended in violation of this section and whether 
his conduct proximately contributed to his own 
injuries were issues on which the defendant 
manufacturer of the garbage truck had the 
burden of proof and it was the duty of the trial 
court to submit such issues to a jury if there 
was any reasonable basis for doing so. Thomp-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 
62 (1964). 
Jury question. 
Where there was a lack of certainty as to 
plaintiffs attention to truck involved in colli-
sion and whether plaintiff was close enough to 
control the truck, a jury question existed as to 
whether the truck was left "unattended" 
within the meaning of this section. Thompson 
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for driver's injuries caused as result of obstruc-
tion. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 
168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). 
Nondelegable duty. 
A city is charged with a nondelegable duty to 
exercise due care in maintaining its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition 
and may incur tort liability for breach of this 
duty by virtue of this section. Murray v. Ogden 
City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any iryury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ture, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9. 
ANALYSIS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Latent defective condition. 
Legislative intent. 
Negligent construction. 
Notice to city. 
Other public improvement. 
Latent defective condition. 
Defect in a county storm drain that was dis-
coverable by a reasonable inspection was not a 
latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). 
Legislative intent. 
Intent of legislature was to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for private 
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on 
a dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Negligent construction. 
Where university construction diverted flow 
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-
ing other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ernmental immunity was waived and univer-
sity was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 
(1971). 
Notice to city. 
Requirement that notice of claim be given to 
political subdivision within ninety days (now 
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this 
section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law). 
Other public improvement 
Damages to house and basement partially 
incurred from defective conditions of sewer 
drain and canal fell under purview of this sec-
tion. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
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(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assis-
tance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacua-
tions. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amend-
ment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection 
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune 
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. The 1985 amendment, effective March 18, 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 109, § 1. 1985, added Subsection (1)(1) and made minor 
Amendment Notes. — The 1982 amend- changes in phraseology, 
ment designated the former section as Subsec- Cross-References. — Indemnification of 
tion (1); substituted letters for numbers as sub- public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
division designations; and added Subsection 63-30-38 
(2). 
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64-7-7.1. Responsibility for education of school-aged chil-
dren at hospital — Responsibility for noninstruc-
tional services. 
(1) The State Board of Education is responsible for the education of school-
aged children at the Utah State Hospital. 
(2) In order to fulfill its responsibility under Subsection (1), the board may 
contract with local school districts or other appropriate agencies to provide 
educational and related administrative services. 
(3) Medical, residential, and other noninstructional services are the respon-
sibility of the division. 
History: C. 1953, 64-7-7.1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — State Board of Educa-
1986, ch. 6, § 2. tion, Chapter 2 of Title 53. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, ch. 6, § 4 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1986. 
64-7-7.3. Transfer of supplies, equipment, and budgetary 
funds to board. 
All supplies, equipment, furniture, and budgetary funds which were, before 
the effective date of this act, under the Department of Social Services but, 
because of this act, now come under the jurisdiction of the State Board of 
Education, shall be transferred to the board as of the effective date of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 64-7-7.3, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, ch. 6, § 4 
1986, ch. 6, § 3. ^ makes the act effective on July 1, 1986. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this Cross-References. — Transfer of powers, 
?£'! ^ u " ^ *?**? * i i" c t i?f 'm e a M U w 8 duties and functions to division, § 64-7-4. 1986, ch. 6, §§1 to 3, which appear as 
§§ 53-18-9.5, 64-7-7.1, and 64-7-7.3. 
64-7-8. Objectives of facilities. 
The objectives of the Utah State Hospital and other mental health facilities 
shall be to care for all persons within the state who are subject to the provi-
sions of this act, and to furnish them proper attendance, medical treatment, 
seclusion, rest, restraint, amusement, occupation, and support conducive to 
their physical and mental well-being. 
History: R.S. 1898, $ 2154; L. 1903, ch. act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2154; L. 1909, ch. 29, 1951, ch. 113, §§ 2 to 4, which appear as vari-
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 5384; ItS. 1933, 85-7-10; L. ous sections throughout this title. See Table of 
1935, ch. 95, § 1; C. 1943,85-7-10; L-1951, ch. Session Laws in Parallel Tables volume. 
113, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 1; 1975, ch. 198, § 5. Cross-References. — Commitment and 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this care of criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
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64-7-5. Bule» and regulations. 
Compiler's Note*. — Far similar provi-
sions, see 3* 62A-12-205 to 62A-12-208. 
64-7-6. Record of board proceedings — Maintenance 
buildings — Expenses for treatment. 
Compiler's Notes. — For similar provi-
sions, see §§ 62A-12-205 to 62A-12-208. 
64-7-7. Supervision and treatment of mentally ill person 
by division. 
Compiler's Notes. — For similar provi-
sions, see §§ 62A-12-205 to 62A-12-208. 
64-7-7.1. Responsibility for education of school-aged chil-
dren at hospital — Responsibility for noninstruc-
tional services. 
Compiler's Notes. —- For similar provi-
sions, see §§ 62A-12-205 to 62A-12-208. 
64-7-7.3. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals budgetary funds to the State Board of Educa-
§ 64-7-7.3, as enacted by Laws 1986, ch. 6, § 3, tion, effective January 19, 1988. 
relating to transfer of supplies, equipment and 
64-7-8 to 64-7-24. 
Compiler's Notes. — For similar provi-
sions, see §§ 62A-12-209 to 62A-12-225. 
64-7-24.5. Escape of criminals. 
Any person committed to the Utah State Hospital under the provisions of 
Title 77, Chapter 48 or 49 [Chapter 15 or 16], or under the provisions of 
Section 77-24-15, who escapes or leaves without proper legal authority is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 175, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, Compiler's Notes. — See note following 
§ 10; 1987, ch. 92, § 135. same catchline in notes to this section in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- bound volume. f 
ment substituted "is" for "shall be deemed" and For similar proceedings, see § 62A-12-22& 
made a minor change in the first statutory ref- Cross-References, — Sentencing for misde> 
erence. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. ' 
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History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Inquiry into defen-
1951, ch. 113, 5 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, 5 2; 1971, dant's sanity, Chapter 15 of Title 77. 
ch. 172, § 6 [b]; 1975, ch. 198, § 20; 1979, ch. Limitation of application as to criminally in-
97, I 14. sane, § 64-7-54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Key Numbers. — Mental Health «=» 37 to 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 46. 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
64-7-33- Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 64-7-33 (C. 1943, mission to the Utah State Hospital on certifica-
85-7-59, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. tion by examiners, was repealed by Laws 1975, 
1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, ch. 159, § 1; 1967, ch.
 ch. 198, § 35. 
174, § 130; 1971, ch. 172, § 7), relating to ad-
64-7-34. Temporary admission to mental health facility — 
Requirements and procedures — Costs. 
(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a mental health facility 
upon: 
(a) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, 
stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self 
or others if not immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of 
the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to such belief, and 
(b) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stat-
ing that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individ-
ual within a three-day period immediately preceding said certification 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the 
individual's mental illness, is likely to injure self or others if not immedi-
ately restrained. 
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or 
peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual 
to a mental health facility. 
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a 
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to 
believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that, 
because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial 
likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for 
examination and certification as provided in this act, the officer may take the 
person into protective custody. A peace officer may transport a patient pursu-
ant to this provision either on the basis of his own observation or on the basis 
of the observation of a mental health officer, reported to him by the mental 
health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to 
a mental health facility and there make application for the person's admission 
therein. The application shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the 
following: 
(a) a statement by the officer that the officer believes on the basis of 
personal observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health 
officer reported to him by the mental health officer that the person is, as a 
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result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to self 
others. 
(b) the specific nature of the danger. 
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of dang< 
is based. 
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of th 
officer. 
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum < 
24 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. At the expiratio 
of that time period, the person shall be released unless application for invol 
untary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to § 64-7-36. If sue] 
application has been made, an order of detention may be entered pursuant t 
Subsection (3) of § 64-7-36. If no order of detention is issued, the patient shal 
be released, except when the patient has made voluntary application for ad 
mission. 
(4) Cost of all diagnosis and treatment under this section shall be paid bj 
the county in which such person is found, unless the county participates in th< 
state social services medical program as outlined in § 55-15a-3, in whicl" 
event the state shall pay, or unless the person is financially able to pay the 
same in which event that person shall pay. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by L. of a mental health officer reported to him by 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, the mental health officer" in Subsection (2)(a). 
ch. 159, § 1; 1971, ch. 172, § 8; 1975, ch. 198, Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
§ 21; 1979, ch. 97, § 15; 1981, ch. 261, § 1. act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- ^ 7 5 ,
 ch. 198, §§ 1 to 34, which appear as van-
ment deleted "upon endorsement for such pur-
 o u s sections throughout Titles 26 and 64. See 
pose by a judge of the district court or a mem-
 T a b l e o f Session Laws in Parallel Tables vol-
ber of the board of county commissioners of the
 u 
county in which the individual is present" after n ™ - « »« w~*~« a *• « u o 
n ^ i * »• *u J u r o u Compilers Notes. — Section 55-15a»3, 
certificate in the second paragraph of Subsec- •* j • o u *• tA\ 1 J O 
tion (1); inserted "officer" after "mental f * ™ Subsection (4), is repealed. See 
health" in the first sentence of Subsection (2); £ „ -
 T . . . 
inserted the second sentence of Subsection (2); . Cross-References. Limitation of apphca-
and inserted "or on the basis of the observation t l o n a s to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Key Numbers. — Mental Health •=> 37 to 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 46. 
C.J.S. — 44 CJ.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
64-7-35. Mental health commissioner — Appointment 
Qualifications — Duties. 
The court is authorized to appoint a mental health commissioner to assist in 
the conduct of hospitalization proceedings who shall be an attorney licensed to 
practice law in this state and knowledgeable about mental health. In any case 
in which the court refers an application to the commissioner, the commis-
sioner shall promptly cause the proposed patient to be examined and, on the 
basis thereof, shall either recommend dismissal of the application or hold a 
hearing as provided in this chapter and make findings of fact and recommen-
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dations to the court regarding the order for involuntary hospitalization of the 
proposed patient. 
History: C. 1953, 64-7-35, enacted by L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 9), relating 
1979, ch. 97, § 16. to protective custody pending examination and 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1975, ch. 198, certification. 
§ 35 repealed former § 64-7-35 (C. 1943, Cross-References. —- Admission to practice 
85-7-61, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. law, § 78-51-10. 
64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization on court order — Ex-
amination of patient — Hearing — Power of court 
— Findings — Costs. 
(1) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be 
commenced by the filing of a written application with the district court of the 
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible 
person who has reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the pro-
posed patient which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and 
should be involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompa-
nied by: 
(a) a certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stat-
ing that within a seven-day period immediately preceding the certifica-
tion the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and should be 
involuntarily hospitalized; or 
(b) a written statement by the applicant that the individual has been 
requested to but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condi-
tion by a licensed physician or designated examiner. Said application 
shall be sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the 
application is based. 
(2) Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to 
consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional 
from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the proposed 
patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the court. 
(3) If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath, 
or any reports from a mental health professional that there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the proposed patient's mental condition and immediate 
danger to self, others or property requires involuntary hospitalization pending 
examination and hearing, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to 
an interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, or to 
go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the court may issue an order directed to 
a mental health officer or peace officer to immediately take the proposed 
patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary emergency facility as 
provided in Section [Subsection] 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the pur-
pose of examination. Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examina-
tion, the clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report 
to the court orally or in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the 
examiners, mentally ill, whether the patient has agreed to become a volun-
tary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, and whether treatment programs are 
available and acceptable without court proceedings. Based on such informa-
tion, the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceed-
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ings and dismiss the application. In any event, if the examiner reports orallj 
the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to the clerk of th 
court. 
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings for involuntary hospitaliza 
tion, setting forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts 
together with a copy of any official order of detention, shall be provided by thi 
court to a proposed patient prior to, or upon, admission to a mental healtl 
facility or, with respect to any individual presently in a mental health facilit} 
whose status is being changed from voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing 
of an application for that purpose with the court. A copy of such order ol 
detention must be maintained at the place of detention. 
(5) Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by 
the court as soon as practicable to the applicant, any legal guardian, any 
immediate adult family members, the legal counsel for the parties involved, 
and any other persons the proposed patient or the court shall designate, and 
shall advise such persons that a hearing thereon may be held within the time 
provided by law, unless the patient has refused to permit release of such 
information in which case the extent of notice shall be determined by the 
court. 
(6) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual under 
the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with 
the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this section and said 
court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in the same manner and 
with the same authority as the district court. 
(7) If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district, 
the court may in its discretion transfer the case or patient's custody to any 
other district court within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will 
not be adverse to the interest of the proposed patient. 
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hol-
idays, of the issuance of a judicial order or after admission at a mental health 
facility of a proposed patient under court order for detention or examination, 
the court shall appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed 
patient. If requested by the proposed patient's counsel, the court shall appoint 
as one of the examiners a reasonably available qualified person designated by 
counsel. The examinations, to be conducted separately, shall be held at the 
home of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any 
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's health. 
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten court days of the 
appointment of the designated examiners unless said examiners or the clini-
cal director of the mental health facility shall inform the court prior to said 
hearing date that the patient is not mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to 
become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, or that treatment pro-
grams are available and acceptable without court proceedings in which event 
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings 
and dismiss the application. 
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall 
be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others 
provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel and allow sufficient time to 
consult with the patient prior to the hearing. In the case of an indigent pa-
tient, the payment of reasonable attorney's fees for counsel as determined by 
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the court shall be made by the county in which the patient resides or was 
found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom 
notice is required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the 
hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court 
may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court may 
allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown, 
which cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to 
exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may, 
upon motion of counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given 
out of the presence of any other examiners. The hearing shall be conducted in 
as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a 
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the 
proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence 
which may be offered subject to the rules of evidence. 
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care 
shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information: 
the detention order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, 
the progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to 
the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to the 
patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon 
request. 
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hearing 
and consideration of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: 
(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an imme-
diate danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the 
inability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-mak-
ing process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demon-
strated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
treatment; and 
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order 
of hospitalization; and 
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to 
be hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treat-
ment that is adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and 
needs. In the absence of the required findings of the court after the hear-
ing, the court shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings. 
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which 
the individual shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order 
of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed 
six months without benefit of a review hearing. Upon such a review 
hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an 
order for hospitalization may be for an indeterminate period, if the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required conditions in 
Section [Subsection] 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period. 
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its 
order of hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those 
patients who have been under an order of hospitalization for the desig-
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nated period. At least two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated 
period of any order of hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered 
the original order shall so inform the clinical director of the mental 
health facility responsible for the care of such patient. The director shall 
immediately reexamine the reasons upon which the order of hospitaliza-
tion was based. If the director and staff determine that the conditions 
justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall dis-
charge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate 
report thereof to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. Other-
wise, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and 
proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) of this section. 
(c) The clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee respon-
sible for the care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an 
indeterminate period shall at six-month intervals reexamine the reasons 
upon which the order of indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the 
clinical director or the designee determine that the conditions justifying 
such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the pa-
tient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate report thereof 
to the court and the Division of Mental Health. If the clinical director or 
designee has determined that the conditions justifying such hospitaliza-
tion continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such 
findings to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. The patient 
and the patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the 
involuntary treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that 
the patient has the right to a review hearing by making a request to the 
court. Upon receiving the request, the court shall immediately appoint 
two designated examiners and proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) 
of this section. 
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of 
refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such 
examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a 
reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services 
in the cause. 
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated 
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the 
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court 
within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition 
alleges error or mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impar-
tial designated examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct 
an additional examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other 
respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted. 
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county 
in which the proposed patient resides or is found. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-62, enacted by L. ment substituted "issuing a judicial order" in 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, Subsection (2) for Tiling the application"; in-
ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, ch. serted "or to go to a treatment facility volun-
172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22; 1979, ch. 97, tarily" and "or a temporary emergency facility 
§ 17; 1981, ch. 261, § 2. as provided in section 64-7-38(2)" in the first 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- sentence of Subsection (3); added the last three 
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History: L. 1951, ch. S8, i 1; C. 1943, read "Thereafter, the term of office of a justice 
Supp., 104*2-1; 1969, ch. 247, ( 1; 1986, ch. of the Supreme Court is ten years and until his 
47, t 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4. successor is appointed and approved in accor-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- dance with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsec-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection tion (6), substituted "determines" for "decides" 
(2), rewrote the former second sentence which at the end of the fourth sentence. 
78-2-2* Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings, origi-
nating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except the following: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (i). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
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Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Cftort dt APP 
under Subsection (3)(b). *-*"**• 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 4 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceeding!. 
History. C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. Subsection (3Xe); added 8ubsection (3X0; 
llmX?^' „47J ' 4 1 ; m1' c h # 1 6 1 ' * 3 0 3 ; 1 9 8 8 ' designated former Subsections (3Xf) to (3Xi ch. 248, 5 5. - - . - . 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
cordingiy; substituted "(D* for W at the 
of Subsection (4Xg); and made minor styli 
changes. 
ANALYSIS 
Docketing statement 
—Reference to subsection. 
Cited. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Docketing statement 
—Reference to subsection. 
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987, 
reference in the docketing statement to this 
section will be considered insufficient; instead 
the appropriate subsection must be included to 739 P.2d 634 (Utah C t App. 1987) 
alert the Supreme Court that it has original 
appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gregory 
Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 (Uti 
1987). 
Cited in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc* 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tern 
pore, and practice of law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Stewart v. Coffman, 73 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 119 (Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 50 repeals ing that the Supreme Court is always open, 
§ 78-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provid- effective April 25, 1988. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and services of any 
sheriff in the state. 
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tOBERT L. JEFFS. #4349 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
attorneys at Law, P.C. 
attorneys foe Defendants 
>0 North 100 East 
». O. Box 888 
»rovo. Utah 84603 
telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ESTATE OF MARCEL SCHOPF. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
JON MICHAEL PETERSEN. DALE R. 
BROWN and SUSETTE A BROWN, and 
STATE OF UTAH. STATE HOSPITAL. 
Civil No. CV 87-999 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
COMES NOW. Dale R. Brown, and being first duly sworn. 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the named defendants in the above-
entitled matter. 
2. At the time of the accident which is the subject 
matter of this action. I owned with my wife Susette A. Brown, 
a 1980 AMC Concord. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DALE R. BROWN 
L^/K. U.4- A. 
3. On November 1# 1986, shortly before 1:00 p.m., I 
rove my car to return a VCR and then pick up my son. Jason, 
t a nearby friend's home where Jason had been attending a 
rimary party. 
4. I parked my car in front of my friend's home at 
^proximately 500 East 100 North in Provo. 
5. I left the motor running and the keys in the 
jnition because I was only going to the door to get Jason and 
>uld only be away from the c^ r momentarily. 
6. As I pulled up in front of my friend's house, I 
iw a neighbor, John Ringer, outside about two houses away and 
ived to him. 
7. I did not notice anyone else in the vicinity. 
8. I left the car unattended for less than one 
nute. 
9. When 1 returned, my car had been stolen. 
10. I later learned the identity of the man who 
ole my car as Jon Michael Petersen, one of the defendants in 
is action. 
11. I never authorized or permitted Mr. Petersen to 
ive my car. 
12. I did not know that Mr. Petersen intended to 
ive my car prior to him stealing it. 
13. Mr. Petersen was not and has never been my agent 
employee. 
14. Mr. Petersen was not acting in my behalf when he 
tole my vehicle. 
FURTHER your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED and signed this Viro^  day of September, 1987. 
f^SAsCLr £\ Jo^0i^rJ 
Dale R. Brown 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \ \Ctj\ day of 
e^tSer, 1987. 
Notary Public , ,,
 0 
Residing at: tW,SLjom ATp H? O H 61 
y Commission Expires: 
tUffclten W. Barrwt 
Notary Public 
Commission Expires April 30, 1993 
_-*_ 
iT CONTINUATION - NAAAATIVt I CASE NO." 06-51485 
M. Petersen, »n escapee frcm the Utah ftate Hospital had stolen a vehicle from 
ast 100 North in Provo. Owner of the stolen vehicle followed suspect onto X-i9# 
rbound as far as 12th South Orem exit. Highway Patrol Dispatch advised that the 
I I I I I I • ! • • • • IIWI ' ""' ' " m ' " -
n vehicle wa_f nortWxxnd# approximately 2 miles north of their office and the driveij 
red intoxicated* At 500 East American Fork interchange, Trooper Hint observed the 
n vehicle, Deputy Harris fe l l in behind Trooper Ifcnt at 500 East 1-15 to ass ist 
the stolen vehicle* The stolen vehicle accelerated and the driving pattern was 
erratic, susgect vehicle was weaving back and forth. Suspect Petersen said he saw 
trooper behind hi** with his lights on. Suspect Petersen said he decided to rua froa 
oocer, so he accelerated as fast as the car could go* Suspect Petersen said he was 
85 miles peg hour. Trooper Hunt pulled along the side of the suspect to get a 
Ave identif igfttion of the suspect, Trooper Hunt stated that the suspect was flipping 
te bird. Suspect said as Trooper Bunt pulled along the side of him# he flipped 
tooper the bird and yelled, »Fvck You"* Suspect said while he was flipping the 
at the Trooper* he lost control of the car, and the next thing that he remenbers 
ten he crash*** Suspect Petersen said he had no intention what-so-ever of stopping. 
Trooper Hunt and Deputy Harris observed the suspects vehicle drifting off to the 
edge of the roadway. The suspect then over-corrected and took the vehicle across 
lanes of travel into the median strip, and into the path of scaith-bourid traffic. 
d of suscgrt*J vehicle was 80+). The victim- Marcel Schopf was going south-bound 
at about 65 miles per hour - 2 miles per hour. The suspects vehicle 
he iredic^seflftnq a great deal of debris vp into the air with i t # as i t went air-
i. The suspect's vehicle hit the front left corner (or dr ivers side) of the 
wag™ Van, tfius pushing the van to the side twest) and hitting a mall Red Oattfo 
vp. The debris that came vp when the puspect's vehicle went air-bound, h i t 
byota causing damage to the windshield and front quarter pannel. the Tojfota va* 
. . .
 m i - • i • • • - • — • — — m 
ont of the white Volkswagen while going south-bound. Both American Pork and IfiWL 
. % .. 
ances assisted* Victim- Marcel Schopf was pinned in the front seat of the vehiol*h 
• -—— ^ ;-v_ J-1'" 
a extracated frcm the vehicle and taken to American Cork Hoepit.il.' Marcel Schopf 
PAOC or 
REPORT C O N T I N U A T I O N - N A R R A T I V E CASE NO.- 86-51485 
was pronounced dead at the Hospital. Suspect - John M. Petersen was uxJeroeath the 
yellow AlC, and was also taken to the American Fork Hospital. Suspect Petersen was 
placed under arrest, both blood and urine sanples were taken. Suspect was released by 
the Emergency Room physician and by our Deputies, back into the custody of the Utah 
State Hospital, Accident investigation, pictures, & witness statements were corpletecl 
at the scene. Deputies of the Utah County Sheriff's Department attended the autopsy. 
Positive identification of the victim has been made by both the brother, and friends. 
- • • • • .. _ _ _ .. . ..- ^ . P 
-J.P. Harris 
Badge i 1J27 
Utah County Sheriff' s Department 
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i-±sr Hoi 
INDEOTIFYING INFORMATION 
Jon Michael Peterson is a 21 year old, sincrle, white male 
admitted for the fifth time on May 24, 1982. The last admission 
to this facility was in September of 1981 for two months. 
INFORMATION SOURCES 
Records from the university Medical Center 
Records from Granite Mental Health 
Records of prior admissions to the Utah State Hospital 
Interview with patient who is a moderately reliable source 
Recent Utah State Hospital records. 
REASON FOR CONTINUED STAY 
The precipitating event for this admission to the hospital 
occured when Jon held a friend hostage at knife point then tryed 
to kill him. The friend was stabbed superficially about four times 
and Jon cut his own hand accidentally during the incident. The 
reason for Jon's continued stay at this facility is due to a lack 
of a consistent absence of sub-acute psychotic symptcms. This 
patient has quite frequent hypo-manic run episodes which result in 
greater agitation, irritability, and other threats of violence. 
This is especially significant for this patient due to his assaul-
tive-injurious behavioral history. This patient also does not 
manifest the necessary insight to recognize the dangerous state 
that he becomes when he manifests acute psychotic symptcmatoloqy. 
Mr. Peterson is also on an undeterminate court cxrtiTdttment. 
INFORMATION RELATIVE TO EARLIER ADMISSIONS 
When previously released frcm this facility on November 30, 
1981. Jon went to live and ANE Nursing Heme in Salt Lake City. 
He received treatment at Granite Mental Health, and in early 1982 
he moved to an apartment where the incident occured. It appears 
that any disposition planning will have to necessarily include a 
placement at a residential treatment settina, one that is secure 
enough to monitor his progress and to decide whether or not 
independent cannunity living is an appropriate option. Might we 
mention here that due to his severe threatening behavior state 
that this may not be ah appropriate option due to this present 
condition. This patient is a moderate danger when he becomes 
acutely ill and such caution needs to be exercised when considering 
an appropriate disposition plan. 
ATE HOSPITAL 
WORK SERVICE^ be U....' t<-Thic * 
PATIENT 
.IDENTIFICATION 
PETERSEN, JOHN M 
5 2 S - 9 3 - 1 5 3 3 fl 17NAY19&? 
DATE AND TIME OF EVALUATION: Septeiriber 10, 1983 
jgjfflNEOT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Jon states that there have been no chancres in his family milieu since the 
^iginal social history. Might we add here though, that both of Jon's parents 
pe deaf and that any ccmnunication that we attempt is throuqh Jon's brothers 
^ then act as oautiunicatorm to the parents* It could also be mentioned that 
jon's two brothers appear to be responsible/ functioning, young adults who live 
quite successfully in the camnunity. 
POSSIBLE DISCHARGE PLANS 
As mentioned, Jon will require a firm secure residential treatment setting 
once he leaves the hospital. Again, we will mention that Jon has a history of 
assaultive behavior and suicide attenpts. It should also be mentioned that the 
only time that Jon lived independently was the time when he ouickly decaipensate 
and became quite dangerous and resulted in the hcmocide attenpt. Such secure 
residential treatment facilities might include ARTU, ITU/ or seme other fairly 
secure residential treatment facility. It should be mentioned however, that Jon 
will remain hospitalized here until there is no such evidence of the danqerous 
behaviors that have been illuded to here to for. 
CURRENT PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
Jon Michael Peterson is quite an energetic-vivacious youna, single white 
male. When he is not acutely ill, Jon can be ouite pleasant and does maintain 
good groaning and hygiene. Jone faces many limitations due to the early onset 
of his illness, lack on insight, lack of reasoning and judqement and the danaer-
ous potential of violent behavior when he becomes acutely psychotic. Jon lacks 
interpersonal skills, perception, and any significant job skills and he also has 
deficits in his ability to learn at this time. The prognosis is poor and Jon . 
will most likely require same sort of institutional living for the remainder of 
his life. (Xir recemmendation is that Jon remain hospitalized until there is no 
evidence of the acute syirptcmatology which renders him a danger to the outside 
cennunity. 
*r'^3mALlNF0/> 
To Be Uaod For I 
Of This Patioi. 
T»0 NOT R c w ~ JFHOMAS S . BOLLARD,~SSW 
as 
l\i .^ ^L { > ^ 
lHWLTHIST^YPITAL PATTFNT P E T E R S E N , JOHN K 
i«L HISTORY ?5IH!S 5 n - ? a . - 1 5 0 3 M MX 
rc^ txmuii c-, TU I^I^IIC^) ucpo# 
Date Of Admission May 24. 1982 
Date of Current Summary September 10t 1982 
MEMBERS ATTENDING TREATMENT PLAN CONFERENCE: 
>rnof MSW; John Kllarsky, MSV; Tony Gillette, MD; Cherie Cooper, PT; Suzanne Sandrock, OTR. 
Hard, SSW. 
tY OF CURRENT ASSESSMENTS: FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF STAFF, PATIENT AND SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
s evidenced little change during the last three months. He remains highly nervous and 
agitated, and acknowledges auditory hallucinations. He continues to ruminate about 
g people^and occasionally writes songs about guns and knives^ and using these weapons 
1 someone, 
recautions should be maintained due to high assaultive risk and potential danger to the 
ity. Despite the continued homicidal ideation, Jon is cooperative on the ward and there 
een no incidents of aggression or acting-out. 
IT STRENGTHS: 
easant personality when not psychotic. 
od grooming and hygiene. 
T LIMITATIONS: 
rly onset of illness. 
cks insight and judgement. 
SIS: 
phrenia, paranoid type. 295.33 
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DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
T^rw 
Mo i 
PATIENT INTERVIEW NOTES 
ef interview October 8f 1982 Interview conducted by Gail Arno, MSW 
jhe patient came in and sat down on a chair. He appeared nervous, fidgeting in his 
^ t and moving his hands restlessly. 
Asked about his family, he said his parents are both deaf; his father works at Hill 
y0rce Base and his mother works as a cook in an elementary school in Salt Lake City. 
vent to Cottonwood High School for about one week and then quit school to get a job. 
Asked if he went out with girls, he said that he likes girls. He doesn't have a 
-jflfriend but would like to have one. He denied being attracted to boys. fr 
Asked if he ever has fears that he might be homosexual, he stated that all four of 
i^ brothers thought he was queer. One brother asked their father if Jon is queer, but 
jit father said that Jon is just sexy. He did not know why his brothers would think he 
jl homosexual. He denied that the friend he stabbed might be homosexual. 
Talking about this made Jon uncomfortable and the interview was terminated. 
r " - ' 
U. - Port- -• 
• rfCv'\ 
:• j;cTF..a.- -•• 
STATE HOSPITAL 
1DUAL COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT PLAN 
INTERVIEW NOTES PATIENT * f f J t R S C N . J O N . M . 
Date 
6-11-82] 
' -11-82 
6-11-82 
6-11-82 
6-11-82 
6-11-82 
)-82 
Prob J 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3, 
4. 
5. 
6. 
1 7. 
Problem Descripti 
Psychosis as evidenced by the following: 
A. Auditory hallucinations—hears voices, two 
B. Pressured speech. 
C. Agitated behavior. 
D. Flat affect. 
E. Inappropriate laughter and smiling. 
F. Bizarre ideation—speaks of wanting to poke 
G. Homicidal ideation—ruminates and writes so 
people, killing people, and about knives an 
Assaultive by history—stabbed roommate and sel 
University of Utah Medical Center. 
History of sexually imappropriate behavior—foux 
| the University Medical Center, sexual inuendo's 
j History of suicide attempts—jumped from a windo 
[ 1979 and fractured his leg. 
] Physical problems: 
J A. Ear infection—resolved. 
J B. Wou#l infection on hand—resolved. 
J C. Other. 
j D. Ankle broken in 1979—pins are still there, c 
J Disposition planning—deferred until homicidal id 
j level for at least -fc*v*ee months. 
1 Inadequate education—did not complete high schoo 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
INDIVIDUAL COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT PLAN *»;T£ * 
PROBLEM LIST PATIENT V *'- ? 
PAGE OF tw,IT,r ' 
a ^ f i c Behavioral Goals 
*~ Date/Time 
Treatments 
patient performancet 
i*thod of observation 
mchosls will be stabilized 
m< observed by clinical staff. 
^ ^ 
00 
' 
Behavior will be reduced to a 
%txo level. As observed by 
clinical staff. 
Behavior will remain at a 
zero level. As observed by 
clinical staff. 
Suicidal ideation will remain 
at a zero level. As observed 
by clinical staff. 
Symptoms will be reduced to a 
zero level. As observed by 
meiJLcal staff. 
Deferred. 
Patient will obtain GED 
^ * 
to be , Descriptions, 
Achieved tf/f location, frequency 
1 3-//-£>! 
13 11 03-
A . 
* ±-r—TL X •• O r»-
r 
\^}}72r^ 1
 /j* ~r/* T «£, 
ai^xl^U^ 
12-11-82 
A 
Ix!—il-OZ 
«-//-*£ 
Medication, participation 
in community processes, re-
creational activities, and 
structucd groups, seclusion 
time-out and/or restraints 
.as needed. 
Medication, seclusion, 
time-out and/or restraints 
as needed. 
r * — . n — i 1 r — i — , . . ,i -i • • 
4 cigarettes per-day for 
inappropriate sexual be-
havior. 
Medication, suicide pre-
cautions as needed. 
Treatment as needed. 
i 
Placement at Granite MHC. 
1 Classes with Adult 
1 Education. 
Staff assignments 
T. Gillette, MD 
G. Arno, MSW 
D. Johnson, MTRS 
S. Sandrock, 0TR 
T. Gillette, MD 
G. Arno, MSW 
G. Arno, MSW 
E. Green. HA 
G. Arno, MSW 
' T. Gillette, MD 
G. Arno, MSW 
M. Hansen 
'.\r-<*~%- ••*' ' 
TE HOSPITAL 
L COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT PLAN 
BEHAVIORAL GOALS, TREATMENT, ASSIGNMENTS 
OF 
0Ou^ 
PATIENT * 
IDENTIFICATIOB J ? ;?$!* ; , JON 1 
5 : - V - I S O J a 1 ? . 1 A Y 
•4«n of GED requirements 
i^ jA FOR OISCHARGE: * 
tive behavior and homicidal ideation will remain at a zero level for at least fchrcfc^ 
P 
RATION AND AFTERCARE PLANS: 
Urcare with Granite Mental Health Center. 
r the direction of the attending physician: /! *. ^, ( Z > 
Signature ture s^ / U£> 
fwture of treatment coordina 
G . ~ A r n o t MSW 
fnature of representative of agency providing aftercare 
future Of patient Patient not asked to sign. 
Jon Petersen 
Name Of agency Granite MenfajyiEealth Center 
* e n t s 
9-11-82 T. 9-11-82 /mnm 
W STATE HOSPITAL 
I 
i . ' '•••lEHTiM.mr :••• . ! v i , . , 
To E»: Us-' ror Pj--». • 
roNCTfi ir ..:. IVIOUAL COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT PLAN P - T C ^ C C , r t u « 
RANGE GOALS, TERMINATION PLAN, PATIENT *«. i" J;J rii'ci* « V i : o . - u 3 i M l ? « ; v n 
OATE: Septenfaer 14, 1983 
fficSENT: Tcm Bollard, SSW; Jay Steineekert, MSW; Mike Koplin, MSWj Ethel Green, 
Head Attendant, Kathy Cameron, FN; Joseph Mihalik, MDj Max Dastrup, MTRS. 
SIMMARY OF CURRENT ASSESSMENT (INTLUDING PATIENT IhPUT): 
Jon Peterson is a 21 year old, white, single male who was admitted for-the fifth 
time on the 24th of May 1982. This patient continues to remain hospitalized due to 
the manifestation of sub-acute psychotic synptcms. Itds patient continues to have 
what is described as hypo-manic run episodes that result in greater agitation and 
irritability including verbal threats of aggression and violence, etc* This is 
especially significant for this patient which has been mentioned before due to his 
assaultive-injurious behavioral history. Most recently it should be itBnticned, that 
this patient has beocme thorouqhly agqressive and on two episodes was put into the 
seclusion rocm because of his verbal threats of violence, etc. Also this patient has 
shown a greater ijmpulsive behavioral responses in that earlier in the nonth of Septem-
ber while out on a walk, he went ANOL leavinq the hospital qrounds. This patient 
two hours after goina AWX, called the hospital in one of the local shopping centers 
DIAGNOSIS: (continued) 
Schizo-affective disorder 
PATIENT INTERVIEW: 
Patient was quite excited and demonstrated an elevation in mood durino the inter-
view. He again demonstrates lack of insight into his illness and into seme of the 
behavioral concerns that we have. Patient also behaved in a very macho masculine manner 
and stated that he felt dangerous, that he was a tough macho guy and that people had 
to be afraid of him. 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
M-sr
 M D 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL p r T * R S c N , j O H N K 
INDIVIDUAL COMPREHENSIVE PATIENT i ? * : * - ^ ^ ! M 17.1AY1J6 
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tf-NARy OF CURRENT ASSESSMENT (INCLUDING PATINET INPUT): (Continued) 
nd was eventually picked up and returned to the Unit. This patient was then restricted 
o the ward for a 10-day period of time follcvdnq that AWX. 
Our treatment focus presently will be to be more consiencious with security and 
ot letting him leave the ward unattended, that is requiring staff esoort when he does 
eave the ward. (Xir treatment focus will also include evaluation of the treatment 
otentxal that Jon may realize on this ward* There is seme discussion and consideration 
hat Jon may be better suited in a more secure ward setting. This is not conclusive 
presently and further discussion and consideration will be made regarding this issue* 
Iso, we are trying to engage Jon in those activities and those counseling efforts that 
rill inprove his self image, self-esteem and hopefully aid him in trying to imitate^ 
ore acceptable more productive social behaviors, etc. Jon manifests peculiar and *** 
eccentric interpersonal style. He lacks perception of others and that is very evident 
jn his involvement in relationships and quickly identifies him as someone who is 
mentally disturbed. Jon also lacks vocational skills and opportunities for vocational 
xaining are limited due to required supervision of his aggression and tolerance of his 
add excentric behavior, his labile mood and his grandiose thinking. Patient does require 
trained staff supervision or he becomes a behavioral management problem and in potentially 
iangerous. Ihis is manifested not only by his aggressive episodes from time to time but 
lis continual lumination and thinking of aggressive and violent acts and stating these to 
x>th staff and patients. No immediate disposition or discharge planning is beinq consi-
lered at this time. 
ffTSRSCN, JOHN M 
CURRENT PROBLEH LIST: 
orrent problem l i s t remains the same. {see last ICTP) 
GOALS A TREATMENT: 
Orrent goals and treatments remain the same, (see last ICTP) 
5ISCHARGE 4 AFTERCARE PLANS: 
ftercare with Granite Mental Health Center, as arranged through Don Fennimore, 
liason worker for Granite Mental Health Center. Possible placement at AKTU/ITU 
structured treatment fac i l i ty . 
rhis patient will definitely require a residential treatment program followina 
release fron this hospital to further assure satisfactory adjustments and appropriateness 
Eor comiunity living. 
CATfCNT COORDINATOR 
ryCSDFNG PHYSICIAN ' ~" 
THCMftS S. BOLLARD, SSW 
JOSEPH MIHALIK, ?© 
PATIENT'S SIGNATURE 
Jon Petersen 
TAH STATE HOSPITAL 
DIVIDUAL CONPREHENSI\£ PATIENT 
•^CTEUSC^,
 j C r i . , ., 
J . . H M 
JLL_X» JI LJ\ o ^ n (irpn« 
1
 Dorm for about t en months, Nit t h a t was not f -tinl nuplo { ment 
2 Q \ /hoi 11") i, n f i i become a< iu? iu iU ' L1 w i t h Jon P e t e r s e n ? 
3 A I t would be July ot 1984 when 1 s t a r t e d . 
4
 Q Are you f a i r l y fain l id i wit I I" "I . letter, sen 
5 \]\ F 'di i ly t a m i l i a r , ye s . He and I have had s e v e r a l 
• i n t e r a c t i o n s through the whole tunc,1" "  IIIIM MIM-II 
1
 Q A»*J MM i Hi ei acl IUIJS , h.i <,."  tiny ot them involved v e r b a l 
8 a l t e r c a t i o n s between you and MJ , r l e i s e n ? 
9 A I ' d f'i-ay s e v e r a l o f t .hem , 
10 Q I !:•. I Li , 1'etersen s h o r t - f u s e d ? Ts he quick t o anger? 
ii A "I'l'Mii", • s> a good Wciy to d e s c r i b e h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . 
12 \ Q 1111 * * Y »11 ' • i" i" i"i i i i i'J 11 y ^ 11 ri i 111 i,» i u j i, i L i n w j 111 e 111 le r 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
i i 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
• D'tner p a t i e n t s ui s t a f f members? 
P . i • • • • •• ' . ' " 
• ; i ',Iii,iitj .,.::^.;ci ~ ~ " r i r s t of 
a l l , s t a r t i n g with the e a r l i e s t s. d -novipg fo rva r^ , 
T h e e a i 1 i !< I f 111"< 11111« I" 1 11 iv i in 11J e \ 111 111«. i i11111j , 
ii'ii hi, was-"-had h i s c i g a r e t t e p r i v i l e g e s taken away 
fiom him, being ab le t o c a r r y h i s c i q a r e t t e s . 
Q 11 , MinniiboF >i''h' ' ^ I1-11 !! "", 
i1' N I L S was,, i w o u l d s a y I in mi t h a t summer s o m e t i m e . 
And h e d e m a n d e d then) Lvick , and whon hr- WIIMI I I J I V H I hem 
h i " k I' r . ' i l l 11 11 11;? u i I he a t t e J I I i111• -il 1 was 
i n t he proximi ty and )Helped t ake him down " >'l 1 • e l a t e d 
t h i s e a r l i e r wtvn I'"J i«> ii k<*il im in i i ' t ii 'IN I ^SVA 
<; 
i that indelibley recorded. And I had a fractured jaw as 
2 a result• And other incidences were of a less—well, I 
3
 can recall several times that he had to be taken—forcibly 
4
 restrained when he provoked patients, other patients. 
5 As far as staff, I can't recall any other time when §. 
6
 he's attacked a staff member. But I have been involved j 
7 with him, observed him being physically restrained. But 
8 as far as verbal altercations, they were daily. So I 
9 couldn't recall anything that sticks out in my mind. 
io Q On these physical altercations, is it fair to say 
M they're essentially two types? One is when he's denied 
12 something that he wants? 
13 A That's one time. 
*
4
 Q Would the other be when he is insulted, where he 
15 I insults? I mean, what are the other ones? I'll put it 
that way. 
A Okay--
MR. SORENSON: Object for lack of foundation as 
to the extent. 
Q (By Mr. Souvall) Why don't I ask you this. Aside 
from the instance involving the cigarette and other times 
where he's denied something that he would like, what else 
has Jon Petersen done that has resulted in physical 
confrontation with either staff or patients? 
A I can't recall specifics beyond just--as far as under 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
o i ; -
Q '" lould you d e f i n e more ^ e o i f i e a • n 
pun mi i i j i j H i in "iii'jfiiyiiiit'iiii", i" 
i i,,11.' i i
 ( if he (l» '«f'" s? i" t g e t h i^ ? ^ m e t h l ^ a -• ~*= " jnr 1 
for hiii) or hr " s f rust rat'erj ,, _ 0 , ; / 
he has a haici t ime working * >>** •hrough - i .- . * ,,r j e t t i n g 
angry . 
y -. , , ., Were you on 
s h i f t t i l .? 
•
r
*^ » 1 ' - / I S . 
g What iiiiiu did you come on s h i f t ? 
(j i l l -I III 
Q WI f H , n , ) i i i I j ! Il ; i i > 
Si utt Halveisen, "jeona Oreal, and the £ . . ..as L^sa 
Taylor. The T.PN was Diane Messersin, 
Q m.Hl. welt /our responsibilities on that day, If you 
give me n jn'iieral - *they don't need to varYr but --
A Given i weekend , I'spornl i( oa /, r here is very 
little uiganized activities. So M would be more patient 
supervision and making sure that Mir<- followed thn'Mi 
• -ii I-' f • * »" k • wri i , ,j |"j J , »JI,' ( , •,,']. _ •: :.3 weekends 
Ai e you familiar with the revocation of jjn Petersen's 
privileges that day ? 
A I wds aware that they were revoked, yes, 
I * " 
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somewhat of a regular basis in situations where he 
didn't get his way threaten physical violence? 
A. Here again I would have to go back to t 
record and see just how often that occurred. 
Q. Wouldn't that situation arise if Jon 
Petersen were outside the confines of the hospital 
in the general public though? 
MR. S0RENS0N: Object as speculative. 
A. Not necessarily because a good deal of 
his verbal threatening had nothing to do with 
physical violence that he was threatening but just 
abusive language, violent and abusive language. A 
what proportion of that would be to threats of 
physical violence I couldn't tell you without 
looking at the record. 
Q. Can you explain Mr. Petersen's disorder 
in laymen terms, something that would be perhaps 
understandable by myself and others who are not 
atune to psychological terminology? 
A. The symptomology, in other words? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Low impulse control, eradic behavior. 
Q. First, what does low impulse control 
mean? 
Low impulse control simply meaning that 
(Examination by Mr- Souvall) 22 
1 playful tussles with some of the staff, becomes more 
2 and more vigorous and pushing things until he is 
3 finally ordered to cease"? 
4 MR. SORENSON: I will stipulate that's 
5 what the document says. 
6 MR. SOUVALL: Okay. 
7 Q. Are there specific instances that you are 
8 aware of where Jon Petersen became physically 
9 violent during the time period just prior to this 
10 report? 
11 A. Would you clarify what you mean by 
12 physically violent? 
13 Q. Well, let's say using physical force as 
14 in shoving, tackling, hitting either open fisted or 
15 closed fisted. And if you need to delineate the 
16 various levels of violence feel free to. 
17 A. He was violent in that when he didn't get 
18 his way, he was told to do certain things and he 
19 would refuse to do them and so then help would be 
20 called in and he would fight and struggle as he was 
21 being taken to a more restrictive environment. 
22 Q. What kind of struggling was involved? 
23 Was he merely trying to get out of the grasp of the 
24 people restraining him or did he actually strike 
25 them? 
axamanauon oy Mr. Souvall) 30 
1 Q. Was Jon Petersen placed into a restraint 
2 or seclusion situation? 
3 MR. SORENSON: Following this particular 
4 incident? 
5 MR. SOUVALL: Yes. 
6 A. Here again I could refer to any time an 
7 individual is placed into a seclusion or restraint 
8 situation there is what we call a special progress 
9 note entered into the chart which is not necessarily 
10 a progress note of this nature but is on a separate 
11 form, so in order to answer that totally I would 
12 have to find the special progress note. 
13 MR. SOUVALL: Off the record. 
14 (Discussion off the record.) 
15 Q. You have before you what appears to be, I 
16 think it was called a Special Incident Report? 
17 A. Yes, Special Progress Note. 
18 Q. Special Progress Note regarding this 
19 incident. Do you know the drafter of that document? 
20 A. Carol Hoffman, yes. 
21 Q. What is the nature of the Special 
22 Progress Report? 
23 A. Would you like me to read it? 
24 Q, Please, if you would like. 
25 A. The event description includes a 
(Examination by Mr. Souvall) 31 
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statement that, "During the disagreement and scuffle 
patient was taken down by the posse". 
Q. What is the posse? 
A. The posse is a security team of 
patients. They are supervised in any security 
measure by staff but they are an on-ward security. 
"The posse was too rough and patient was 
bruised and lacerated. Immediate actions taken, 
patients right-upper inner arm is bruised in 
four-by-four inch area. Patient also has three or 
four fingernail scrapes on right side of his neck. 
He has a small lesion on chin and lips. Alcohol 
applied to wounds." 
Q. Does it indicate any punishment or 
consequences so to speak for this action? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any confinement say of any kind 
for this? 
A. Not according to this. 
Q. Let's go on to the next incident 
involving September 3rd, I believe, and I think 
that's the next Special Incident Report. 
MR. S0RENS0W: You are working backwards 
in time now? 
MR. SOUVALL: Yes. 
(Examination by Mr, Sorenson) 40 
1 individual resulting from any of those previous past 
2 ones? 
3 A. On the past one on 9-1-83 he was gone 
4 approximately two hours. I would have to check. 
5 And he was gone for approximately two hours and he 
6 called us to come and get him. 
7 Q. On the fourth paragraph of Exhibit 1 you 
8 mention participating in several camp trips. Are 
9 those sponsored and are those conducted by the 
10 hospital personnel? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. You mention working at the Castle. What 
13 is the Castle? 
14 A. The Castle is a recreation project that 
15 we do each year in order to generate some funds for 
16 the recreation program. As we determine who will be 
17 participants in the Castle we clear names. That 
18 sounds -- that's hospital terminology but we 
19 determine who is -- who has progressed far enough 
20 that they can be included in that because it is at 
21 night and there is a very strong potential for AWOL. 
22 Q. What is the nature of that activity? 
23 A. What we do is we have five to seven 
24 nights where we invite the public to come. They buy 
25 tickets and each of the units sets up a room very 
0 Have you seen any involvement, physical altercations, 
where he started out as play and the force involved becomes 
something along the lines of anger behind it? 
A Not that he initiated, no. 
Q But that he became involved in and struck back? 
A Struck is a pretty powerful term. I didn't ever see 
him actually directly hit. It was more in defense than 
fighting off someone else. 
Q How would these fights start? 
A Jon is very good at verbal intimidation. 
Q Would he initiate this verbal intimidation? 
A Yes. 
Q Were there some incidents involving verbal intimidation 
that resulted in physical action that you remember, either 
against him or by him? 
A By him, I saw—he loved to intimidate you. He would 
get right in your face, call you a name or pick up on some 
little thing you hadn't done that day that you knew you 
were supposed to have done—he fs very familiar with hospital 
rules--to see just how far he could push you to get your 
goat, so to speak. 
Q How often would something like this occur? 
A Maybe three times a week. Jon is very unpredictable. 
I don't know. He had weeks of good periods and weeks when 
he wouldn't. I'll give you an average of three times a 
c 
(Examination by Mr. Souvall) 36 
1 become conceivably -- if at some time Jon could 
2 become accountable for his actions, more accountable 
3 for his actions an effort would be made to place 
4 him. The aim is to get him back in the community if 
5 he can be a considerably responsible person. So 
6 that's always held out there but that does not 
7 indicate we were in the process of doing that. 
8 Q. Also this document under current problem 
9 number 12 says, "poor impulse control". What did 
10 you mean by that? 
11 A. When he doesn't get his own way he stomps 
12 off, yells, uses vulgar language. If he has a 
13 package of cigarettes he smokes them all right now. 
14 If he has some money he doesn't consider the 
15 future. He will spend all of his money right now. 
16 MR. SOUVALL: I have no further questions 
17 regarding this document only to mark as Exhibit 17. 
13 (Deposition Exhibit No. 17 was marked.) 
19 Q» I have before me a document dated 
20 8-22-86. It indicates that you are present and 
21 present ing. 
22 A. Do you have one of these? 
23 Q. I want to make sure that we have the same 
24 document, yes . 
25 Q. Regarding the diagnosis section it says 
(Examination by Mr. Souvall) 39 
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A. 
MR. SOUVALL: Yes. 
I don't know if it was in this time or it 
was probably before this time, but something as 
serious as setting fire in the smoking room. That's 
the most serious thing that comes on mind. 
Q. Can you provide us with details of what 
occurred in that incident, what details you recall? 
A. I can't except that he became distraught 
about or upset about something and barricaded the 
door and set fire to the carpet in the corner of the 
smoke room. 
Q. When people came into the room did he 
confront them physically? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Now, next page discusses interpersonal 
skills team TC. Problem description, "Jon does not 
get his way. When he perceives that others are 
saying things about him that reflect he is less than 
perfect he looses his temper as evidenced by 
yelling, name calling and stomping off 60 times per 
month." And then the specific goals that he will 
not loose his temper more than 3 0 times per month. 
Did these temper tantrums, so to speak, reflect 
anything other than yelling, name calling and 
stomping to your recollection? 
Date of Admission Mav 24. 1982 
Date of Current Summary March 7. 1984 
:F MEMBERS ATTENDING TREATMENT PLAN CONFERENCE: D: 3-7-84 T: 3-7-84 
i l Arno, ACSW; MaryAnn Kraemer, RN; Anthony G i l l e t t , MD; Mary Ellen Wilkinson, MSW; 
m Pershin, OTR; Leona Orya l l , PT; Bob Hunter, Head Attendant; Tom Bol lard, S5W; Four 
tdent Nurses. 
tARY OF CURRENT ASSESSMENTS: FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF STAFF, PATIENT AND SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
i ng the last year, t h i s patient has made no observable progress, Homocidal ideation 
s t i l l present; however patient is more reluctant to ta lk about i t . He continues to 
r voices, is continually agi tated, and has frequent assaultive episodes. Speech is 
ssured. In September 1983, he went AWOL but called the ward af ter two hours and asked 
someone to come get him. During the next two months, he decompensated, becoming more 
eatening and assaultive. In November, he was transfered to State I I I due to the aggressive 
ing out. In this ward he has been cooperative and anxious to please but continued 
have episodes of becoming paranoid and threatening. Discharge plan is to place him 
a group home or simi lar structured environment. However, th is is deferred unt i l 
oc ida l , ideation and assaultive behavior have been absent for at least six months. 
U. ASSESSMENT SCALE RATING: NA 
':NT STRENGTHS: 
isant personality when not psychotic 
1 grooming and hygiene. 
:NT LIMITATIONS: 
y onset of i l lness. 
:s insight and judgment. 
I0SIS: 
zo-af fect ive disorder 295.70 
OSIS: 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
iTATE HOSPITAL 
IDUAL COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT PLAN 
SMENT SUMMARY, STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, ,:; -* Y , 5 c PATTFMT * • - Pi * 
PATIENT INTERVIEW NOTES 
te of interview Mrch 7. 1984 Interview conducted by p,^i
 flrnn 
•n came in and sat down, choosing a chair that he could rock in; he rocked rapidly 
iroughout the Interview. 
itient stated he is doing well; he likes to keep busy and gets bored when not busy, 
i would like another job for the mornings, like at the laundry. "I would like to get 
> in the morning, do my ward work and everything, then go to work at the laundry, eat 
inch, then work with Blake in the afternoon. I like it when I'm busy." Asked what 
i does with his time when not working, he replied, "play pool." He doesn't read because 
? can't see well with his glasses anymore. 
iked what goals he has for himself, he stated, "live in my own apartment, I had fun 
1 my own apartment." He also wants to get a driver's license, "I know how to drive 
car, my Dad let me drive his car once." He has also driven his father's truck. 
sked if he had gone home for visits when on State I, he replied, "yeah." They went 
pretty good." 
ked if he had questions, he wanted to know when he would be able to move someplace 
ise. He would like to go to Opportunity House. It was explained to him that he needs 
o get a red and blue pass and also needs to be thinking more clearly. He was satisfied 
ith this and the interview was terminated. 
ToBaU:-- rn. .-
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 D . T t r u T *
 A %
'"" * S „ T ? , " , / S 3
 5 ? . 1 9 * - <• • 
IENT INTERVIEW NOTES inFUTlFlcSlOH: * ' - . ** \\ - ^ 1 r « - ' ' • 
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Prob. 1 
No. 
1. 1 
2. 1 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1 6. 
1 7' 
1 8-
9. 
10. 
// 
I 
Psychosis as evidenced bv the following: 
A. Auditory hallucinations—hears voices* two women and occasionally a man. 
B. Presssured SDeech 
C, Agitated behavior 
D. Flat affect 
E. InaDDrooriate lauqhter and smilinq. 
F. Bizarre ideation—speaks of wantina to poke airTs eves out. 
6. Homicidal ideation—tired to kill best friend; ruminates and write sonqs 
about stabbinq and shootinq people, killinq people, and about knives and 
quns. 
Assaultive behavior—stabbed best friend prior to admission. 
History of sexually inappropriate behavior found kissinq female patient at the 
University Medical Center; homosexual activity with male patients. 
History of suicide attempts—jumped from a window at Granite Inpatient in 1979 
and fractured his leq; occasional suicidal ideation. 
Physical problems: 
i A. Ear infection—resolved. 
B. Wound infection on hand—resolved 
C. Other. 
[ D. Ankle broken in 1979—pins are still there, occasional pain and discomfort. 
1 Disposition planninq—deferred until homicidal ideation is reduced to a zero 
level for at 1ea~st six months; placement in a group home or similar structured 
environment. 
Inadequate education—did not complete high school 
Inadequate independent living skills 
No job skills or~employment history 
AWOL risk—patient went AWOL in September 1983. 
| • — . . . * • * * • *, ^j 
d 
STATE HOSPITAL 
IDUAL OCMPREHWSIVE OBEAIMENr PLAN 
PM T/TCTP 
PATHNT 
TTWfcJ I* IL»! /^fcmr #"m* - ' - - > . ' . O S W «A» • 
Specific Behavioral Goals 
Patient performance, 
method of observation 
Date/Tine 
to be 
Achieved 
Treatments 
Descriptions, 
location, frequency Staff assignment 
svchosis will be stabilized 8-8-84 TPTT Medication, participation in A. Gillett, MP 
s observed bv clinical staff. community processes, recrea- G. Arno* ACSW 
lomocidal ideation wil l be tional act iv i t ies, and B. Hunter, PT 
absent for at least six months structured groups, seclusion 
time-out and/or restraints as 
needed. G. Restricted from 
all sharps. 
Jehavior will be reduced to a 8-8-84 Medication, seclusion, time- A. Gillett, MD 
tero level. As observed by out and/or restraints as G. Arno, ACSW 
:linical staff. needed. B. Hunter, PT 
Behavior will remain at a 8-8-84 Four cigarettes per day for G. Arno, ACSW 
zero level. As observed by inappropriate sexual behavior B. Hunter, PT 
linical staff. 
Suicidal ideation will remain 8-8-84 Medication, suicide precau- G. Arno, ACSW 
at a zero level. As observed tions as needed. Restricted B. Hunter, FT 
by clinicals taff. from all sharps. 
Symptoms will be reduced to a 8-8-84 Medical treatment as needed. A. Gillett, MD 
zero level. As observed by M. Kraemer, RN 
medical staff. 
Deferred 8-8-84 Placement in a group home or G. Arno, ACSW 
similar structured environment 
Patient wil l obtain GEO— Deferred Classes with adult education K. C. Lunceforc 
Deferred until patient agita- G. Arno, ACSW 
tion.is reduced sufficiently 
to be able to concentrate on 
written material. 
Skills will be improved by 8-8-84 Activities of Daily Living a flrnn. ACSW 
50*. As observed by clinical Group, Social skills and craftl T RniiarH. <;<; 
groups, otner groups as aeemea I Hunter j^ f" 
appropriate. 
staff. 
!E HOSPHAL 
JAL OOMPREHENSTVE TREATMENT PLAN 
C BEHAVIORAL GOALS, TREATMENT, ASSIGNMENTS 
— - 1 v Jx U*.r: For 
PATIENT 
IDEta'jurjXanCN: * 
f^ noii: O i l S 7&M/S3 DR. SILUtT 
U _ « C n * 
A ^ c a u i U i V U S 
1 
Patient performance, 
method of observation 
Date/Time 
to be 
Achieved 
Patent will attend work ] 8-8-8* I 
Assignment and oerform adeau- J 
telv. As observed bv clinical 
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commi tment? 
A. Involuntary. 
Q, Did you have occasion prior to this, 
prior to the latest AWOL to observe Mr. Petersen 
when he became angry? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At those times when you observed him to 
be angry did you have occasion to observe whether 
that condition lasted for a long time? 
A. Here again defining long time, in my own 
personal, you know, when I was actually there seeing 
that happen they were always of very short duration, 
and by very short I mean three to four sentence time 
frame. 
Q. Did he seem to harbor a grudge after 
those incidents based on your observation? 
A. As a general rule? 
Q. 
A. 
Yes . 
No, not generally. 
MR. SORENSON: I think that's all I 
have . 
RE-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SOUVALL: 
D u r i n g , I b e l i e v e , t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s 
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in 1985 -- I am referring to Exhibit 1 -- that he 
went AWOL from another facility. What facility was 
that again? 
A. I believe it was R-2 which stands for --
MR. S0RENS0N: I think when she says R-2 
Q. ARTU? 
A. Yes. It's a halfway house in Salt Lake 
but it's a residential treatment unit run and 
supervised by the Community Mental Health System. 
MR. S0RENS0N: What ,-^s the "A" stand 
for, adult? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I think it is, Adult 
Residential Treatment Unit. 
Q, Now, it says on 2-4, "Put on therapeutic 
leave to ARTU." And then on 2-9-85, this is on page 
two, it says "Return to State I after going AWOL 
from ARTU." And then on 2-22, "Transfer to State 
III." What does State I and State III mean? 
A. On this date what is now was called Adult 
II was then State III and that was based on some 
logistical things that occurred before I got here. 
And* when we moved to a different floor the name was 
changed and that's really all it reflects. 
Q. Prior to the incidents of November 1 is 
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A. To my recollection, no. 
Q. Does he ever throw things? 
A. To my recollection he didn't throw 
things. 
Q. Now, I don't see a problem statement on 
this. Is there one? I mean something like the 
others where they are numbered. 
A. This took the place of those. 
Q. Now, since this report had been prepared 
and prior to the incident on November 1, 1986 what 
other instances were there of Jon's behavior 
becoming violent or physical other than stomping, 
tantrums, the yelling and stomping tantrums? Were 
there incidents involving physical altercations you 
were aware of? 
A. I am not aware of any. 
Q. Was Jon considered an AWOL risk prior to 
November 1, 1986? 
A. Prior to the time that he went AWOL? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I think I have alluded to the back of our 
mind we always considered that there was the 
possibility that Jon could go AWOL. 
Q. Are you aware of the procedure, AWOL 
procedures for your unit? 
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Q Are you generally familiar with the course of treatment 
that was being undertaken in regards to Jon Petersen as 
of November of '86, prior to the incident that the lawsuit 
is— 
A I'm generally aware, but I'm not familiar with the 
specific treatment. 
Q Based on your general familiarity--and we understand 
that you're not familiar with the day to day specifics— 
but based on your general familiarity, do you have a 
conclusion as to whether the course of treatment that was 
being afforded Jon Petersen was in line with the mission 
of the hospital as you've articulated? 
A Yes, I believe it was. I can see no deviation from 
that in terms of his needs or what we were providing. 
MR. SORENSON: That's all I have. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. SOUVALL 
Q Is it also a mission of the hospital that you are here 
to protect the surrounding community from those who could 
be dangerous, disruptive, difficult to manage mentally ill? 
A That's a role of the hospital that we are here to 
provide a setting for the patient that is dangerous to self 
and others. 
Q In addition to then helping the patient to enter the 
community again, though, there is also a role for the 
hospital that involves separating that individual from the 
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community. Is that correct? 
A Yes. There is a responsibility. 
Q Have there been discussions during your period as an 
administrator of building fences around perimeters or posting 
a guard or some sort of a checkin station at the front gate? 
A You mean formal discussions of that? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Informal? 
A Not that I've been part of. 
Q Would you oppose something like that? 
A Yes. I very much would oppose that. 
Q How many AWOL's are you aware of that have occurred 
here at the hospital since you've been supervisor—or, I 
don't want to mischaracterize your title. Is it 
administrator? 
A Superintendent. 
Q All right. Since you've been superintendent. 
A I would have no idea. I couldn't give you a specific 
number. Several. tf 
Q Do they all come to your attention, or is this something 
that you— 
A We have a quality assurance office within the hospital 
and a quality assurance director. All AWOL's, any situation 
that could pose a threat to the patient, are directed to 
9. 
^ / I I If 1 » 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
'k^V,J • 
Q Can you please give us a detailed account—well, when 
did you first see Jon that day, that morning, see or come 
in contact with him? 
A I saw Jon about 9:00 a.m., 9:05. I went down to his 
room to wake him up for medication time. 
Q What did he say at that point? 
A "I don't want to get up. I don't need my medication. 
I worked at the castle last night. I was up late. I want 
to sleep. I'm not going to get up." 
Q What did you tell him at that point? 
A Told him he needed to come and get his medication, 
or he would lose his privileges for the day. 
Q By losing his privileges for the day, what does that 
mean? What privileges does that entail? 
A Soda pops, candy bars, being able to go to the canteen, 
off grounds visits, go out for walks that he would have 
done on his own time. 
Q So did you in fact pull his privileges? 
A Not at that time. 
Q When did you pull his privileges? 
A He came later to the office. It seems that it was 
between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., and he come to the door 
and finally got his medications and requested a cigarette. 
And we told him, no, he was too late for cigarettes. 
Cigarettes are given on the hour for those who don't carry 
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their own. And he said, "Well, why not?" And we told him 
he had to wait 15 more minutes. And we gave him this 
medication at that time, and we told him at that time that 
his privileges were pulled because he hadn't got up to get 
his medication. 
Q What did Jon say and do after he found out his 
privileges had been pulled? 
A At that time he went back to his room and went back 
to bed. 
Q When did you next see him awake? 
A About 10:30. 10:30, 10:45. 
Q What happened then? 
A He wanted to go to the canteen. 
Q Did he ask you to go to the canteen? 
A No. 
Q Did he ask you for permission to go to the canteen? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you tell him? 
A We told him his privileges had been pulled, and he 
already knew that. 
Q So what did he say to that? How did he reply? 
A "I don't care." 
Q Did he say anything else? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Did he show anger? 
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1 the procedure manual and make certain of that. 
2 Q. Do you know if there is a minimum time 
3 period that a person must be missing prior to being 
4 declared AWOL? 
5 A. Yes, but I don't know what it is. On our 
6 unit, and here again this may not specifically be 
7 what the policy says but we have -- if we know that 
8 someone is not there -- can I back up and explain 
9 this a different way? 
10 We have a system on the unit that 
11 requires at any time someone is using their pass o* 
12 going to their industrial or whatever, they must 
13 sign out. And there is a form provided for them to 
14 do that. On the form is included what they are 
15 wearing, what their destination is, who they are 
16 going with, a description of their clothing. If an 
17 individual is not signed back in within five minutes 
18 of that time then we consider them a potential AWOL. 
19 Q. Let's move on to Jon Petersen now. First 
20 of all, let's talk about his industrial program. Is 
21 that what it's called? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Are you familiar with his industrial 
24 program prior to November 1, 1986? 
25 A. Not specifically. 
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to do his tray detail? 
A No. Anytime someone's privileges are pulled, that 
does not mean that they couldn't complete their industrial. 
Industrials is considered a responsibility, not a privilege. 
MR. SORENSON: That's all I have. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. SOUVALL 
Q Isn't it the policy of Unit II, though, that whenever 
a patient is leaving the unit area, the ward, that they 
are supposed to sign out? 
MR. SORENSON: Object. Asked and answered. But 
go ahead and answer the question. 
A Yes. Sometimes. 
Q (By Mr. Souvall) Sometimes what? 
A Can I confer with you on that? 
MR. SORENSON: Sure. 
(Conference.) 
A Sometimes there is a white signout slip that we have 
that is on a clipboard in the office that a person taking 
a patient out, say a treatment coordinator, to do individual 
therapy with them, the other side signs them out on that. 
Q In order to be signed out on the white sheet, do you 
need to be accompanied then by a staff member? 
A Yes. 
Q Was Jon Petersen signed out on a white sheet on that 
day? 
18. 
4 
H A NO. 
2 Q Is it written anywhere that there is an exception on 
3 I the signout requirement of any kind? 
A No. 
5 Q (By Mr. Souvall) No further questions. 
• EXAMINATION BY MR. SORENSON 
7 Q As of November 1 of '86 would you have expected Jon 
8 Petersen to sign out on the white signout sheet on the 
9 clipboard when he took the trays back to the kitchen? 
10 A No. 
ii IQ Had he done that before? 
A No. 
Q In your experience, Diane, had he ever delayed or failed 
to return timely from a tray detail before November 1 of 
•86? 
A No. 
Q In your experience, is the treatment team given a fairly 
broad range of discretion in determining the form that the 
individual patient treatment will take? 
A Say that again real slow. 
Q Does the treatment team have a pretty broad range of 
discretion in deciding what course of treatment will be 
followed for a particular patient? 
A Yes. 
Q When I say course of treatment, am I using that term 
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(Examination by Mr. Souvall) 19 
1 going on, he came to me and reported to me what had 
2 happened at that point. 
3 Q. Now, should Jon have been let out of the 
4 unit without having his, blue slip signed? 
5 A. Technically, no. 
6 Q. Are there any written rules that specify 
7 what procedures patients should go through in order 
8 to get out of the unit with a blue slip? 
9 A . I am not familiar with the exact rules 
10 but I am sure they are in our ward rules but I don't 
11 have them memorized. 
12 Q. But you have been instructed that 
13 patients are not to leave the unit without first 
14 filling out the blue slip procedures? 
15 A. Now, they are allowed to leave with a 
16 staff member without a blue slip if they are going 
17 with the staff member and returning with the staff 
18 member. 
19 Q. How long should it have taken Jon to 
20 complete the task had he started it of bringing the 
21 trays back downstairs? 
22 A. Probably within ten minutes. 
23 Q. So say by 12:40 he should have returned 
24 according to this? 
25 A. He should have returned. 
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I the procedure manual and make certain of that. 
Q. Do you know if there is a minimum time 
3 period that a person must be missing prior to being 
4 declared AWOL? 
m A. Yes, but I don't know what it is. On our 
6 unit, and here again this may not specifically be 
7 what the policy says but we have -- if we know that 
8 someone is not there -- can I back up and explain 
g this a different way? 
10 W e have a system on the unit that 
11 requires at any time someone is using their pass or 
12 going to their industrial or whatever, they must 
13 sign out. And there is a form provided for them to 
14 do that. On the form is included what they are 
15 wearing, what their destination is, who they are 
16 going with, a description of their clothing. If an 
17 individual is not signed back in within five minutes 
18 of that time then we consider them a potential AWOL. 
19 Q. Let 's move on to Jon Petersen now. First 
20 of all, let's talk about his industrial program. Is 
21 that what it's called? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Are you familiar with his industrial 
24 I program prior to November 1, 1986? 
** I A. Not specifically. 
